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The United Nations as Good Samaritan: Immunity  
and Responsibility 
Kristen E. Boon∗ 
Abstract 
 
Since the U.N.’s founding, its need for immunity from the jurisdiction of member 
states courts has been understood as necessary to achieve its purposes. Immunities, however, 
conflict with an individual’s right to a remedy and the law’s ordinary principles of 
responsibility for causing harm. This inherent conflict at the center of the immunity doctrine 
has evolved into a very public rift in the Haiti Cholera, Kosovo Lead Poisoning, and 
Mothers of Srebrenica cases against the U.N. 
In these three cases alleging mass torts by the U.N., the independence of the organization 
is perceived by some to have trumped the dignity of affected individuals. Due to a combination 
of factors, including the U.N.’s broad immunities, the limited jurisdiction rationae personae 
of courts over international organizations (IOs), and the nascent state of the U.N.’s own 
internal review mechanisms, not to mention continuing debate over whether human rights 
obligations bind the U.N. directly under international law, these cases of human tragedy 
have resulted in neither compensation by the U.N. to the victims nor access to domestic courts. 
This article argues that the threshold problem with the position that the U.N. is absolutely 
immune is that it severs ordinary legal principles: an organization is responsible for the harm it 
causes by its negligence. Absolute immunity also stands in contrast to the U.N.’s 
programmatic promotion of the Rule of Law and to the standards expected of member states. 
While partial immunity is justified under certain circumstances, the categorical assertion 
of absolute U.N. immunity does not survive an assessment of accountability, distributive 
justice, or economics. U.N. Member States should join the conversation about what 
immunities mean to the U.N. today given its contemporary mandate and impact on 
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individuals. If they do not, there may be consequences for the U.N. that are disadvantageous 
for its future work. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the creation of the U.N. (or the Organization) in 1945, its need for 
immunity from the jurisdiction of member state courts has been understood as 
necessary to achieve its purposes. These immunities extend to its premises, 
property, archives, communications, and the different categories of persons 
connected with it.1 Immunities, however, conflict with an individual’s right to 
a remedy and the law’s ordinary principles of assigning responsibility for causing 
harm. This inherent conflict at the center of the immunity doctrine has evolved 
into a very public rift in the case of three recent mass torts cases against 
the U.N., where the independence of the Organization is perceived by some 
to have trumped the dignity of affected individuals. 
In the Haiti Cholera,2 Kosovo Lead Poisoning,3 and Mothers of Srebrenica4 
cases, individuals have alleged that the U.N. committed a wrong in the 
course of peacekeeping operations, sought a forum to hear their claims, and 
asked for a remedy.5 Due to a combination of factors, including the U.N.’s 
broad immunities, the limited jurisdiction rationae personae of courts over 
international organizations (IOs), the nascent state of the U.N.’s own internal 
review mechanisms, not to mention continuing debate over what obligations bind 
the U.N. directly under international law, these cases of human tragedy have 
resulted in neither compensation by the U.N. to the victims, nor access to 
domestic courts. 
At the heart of the U.N.’s immunity is the notion that it is an organization 
created to save future generations from the scourge of war by maintaining 
                                                 
1  Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations arts. I–VI, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 
U.N.T.S. 15. 
2  Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Complaint, Laventure 
v. United Nations, No. 14-CV-1611 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 11, 2014), available at 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1073738-140311-laventure-v-un-filed-complaint-
2.html. 
3  Letter from Patricia O’Brien, U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, to Dianne Post (Jul. 
25, 2011) [hereinafter O’Brien Letter to Post]. 
4  Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands (Admissibility), App. No. 65542/12, 57 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 114 (2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
122255#{"itemid":["001-122255"]}. 
5  The same situation may arise for states. It has been made public that in 1996, the Government of 
Rwanda requested the establishment of a claims commission for the purpose of considering 
claims by fourteen Rwandan nationals arising out of the U . N . ’ s  alleged failure to prevent 
the genocide in Rwanda. The U.N. declined the request on the grounds that the claims were not of 
a private- law nature. Letter from Pedro Medrano, Assistant U.N. Secretary-General, Senior 
Coordinator for Cholera Response, to Ms. Farha, Mr. Gallon, Mr. Pura and Ms. de 
Albuquerque ¶ 91 (Nov. 25, 2014) (on file with author) [hereinafter Pedro Medrano Letter]. 
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international peace and security.6 The U.N.’s immunities are linked to this 
mandate and are limited to those necessary to fulfill its functions.7 Like the 
Good Samaritan who in good faith assists injured parties is granted some 
immunity from liability in most domestic jurisdictions,8 the U.N.’s immunities 
protect it from vexatious litigation and interference.9 In many jurisdictions, 
similar principles limit the ability of individuals to make claims against federal 
governments10 and charitable organizations.11 
From a fairness standpoint, however, injury or loss of life for the victims 
of U.N. action is no less grievous when caused by the U.N. than by any other 
tortfeasor. Even though the U.N. provides public goods such as a forum for 
world  d ia logue ,  negotiations, and peacekeeping, the theoretical basis for 
granting the U.N. absolute immunity is curiously thin.12 At the time the 
                                                 
6  U.N. Charter preamble; see also Jan Klabbers, The Transformation of International Organizations 
Law, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 11 (2015) (describing functionalist theorists and noting the 
shared adherence to the notion that “international organizations are functional entities, set 
up to perform specific tasks for the greater good of mankind and, as such, in need of legal 
protection”). 
7  “The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and 
immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.” U.N. Charter art. 105, ¶ 1. 
This limited immunity is justified by the functional necessity doctrine, which predicates immunity 
on what is a necessity for the organization. See ICJ Reparation for Injuries Case, Advisory Opinion, 
1949 I.C.J. 174, 183–85 (Apr. 11); see also Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. 
Netherlands (Admissibility), supra note 4 (finding that bringing military operations under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the U.N. within the scope of national jurisdiction would mean allowing 
States to interfere with the key mission of the U.N. to secure international peace and security; 
that a civil claim did not override immunity for the sole reason that it was based on an allegation 
of a particularly grave violation of international law, even genocide; and that in the circumstances 
the absence of alternative access to a jurisdiction did not oblige the national courts to intervene). 
8  See, for example, Victoria Sutton, Is There a Doctor (and a Lawyer) in the House? Why our Good 
Samaritans Laws Are Doing More Harm than Good for a National Public Health Security Strategy: 
A Fifty-State Survey, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 261, 272–76 (2010). It should be noted that 
the question of whether Good Samaritan immunity does actually encourage assistance in 
emergency situations is a highly contested proposition. Dov Waisman, Negligence, 
Responsibility, and the Clumsy Samaritan: Is There a Fairness Rationale for the Good Samaritan 
Immunity?, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 609, 612 (2013). 
9  See Bruce C. Rashkow, Immunity of the United Nations Practice and Challenges, 10 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 
332, 335 (2014). 
10  See, for example, Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 
2412, 2671–2680 (2012) (United States); Crown Proceedings Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 
44 (United Kingdom); D.P. III 1873, 20 Case Blanco (France); Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
[BGB][Civil Code], Aug. 18, 1896, as amended, § 839 (Germany). 
11  See, for example, Note, The Quality of Mercy: “ Charitable Torts” and Their Continuing Immunity, 100 
HARV.  L.  REV. 1382, 1385–86 (1987) [hereinafter Quality of Mercy]. 
12  Jan Klabbers, Unity ,  Dive rs i ty ,  Accountabi l i t y :  The  Ambivalent  Concept  o f  In te rnat ional 
Organisat ion , 14 MELB. J. INT’L L. 149, 153 (2013) (“The net result is that organisations are 
pictured as innately good, socially beneficial creatures, which should be given the room and 
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Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the U.N. (CPIUN) was drafted, 
the whole field of privileges and immunities of IOs was largely “uncharted 
territory,”13 and founding states projected what immunities they thought the 
U.N. would need with little information from practice. The legislative history 
of the CPIUN confirms that the biggest fear of U.N. founding states was the 
threat of a member state trying to control the U.N., not classes of private 
plaintiffs bringing torts cases against the Organization.14  
The projections, made in the U.N.’s infancy, about what immunities the 
U.N. would require do not stand up to scrutiny today. In this Article, I argue 
that while the U.N.’s immunities are extremely broad, there is no principled 
justification for absolute U.N. immunity. Yet, almost without exception, 
national courts continue to uphold it on the basis of the CPIUN.15 I then 
distinguish between the U.N.’s external and internal immunities, and propose 
three criteria for evaluating the scope of internal and external immunities:  whether 
the UN has provided alternate means of settlement, whether the question involves 
                                                 
facilities to perform and perhaps even expand. Many have held that organisations can remedy 
the defects of the global legal order and Nagendra Singh [later President of the International 
Court of Justice] even went so far, in the late 1950s, as to hold that organisations contribute to 
the ‘salvation of mankind.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
13  AUGUST REINISCH, CONVENTION ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS: 
CONVENTION ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES 1 (2009), available at 
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/cpiun-cpisa/cpiun-cpisa_e.pdf (“At the time of the adoption 
of the Charter of the United Nations there were not many legal instruments that could have 
served as examples for what was intended to be achieved .  .  .  .  Thus, the privileges and 
immunities of international organizations was largely uncharted territory.”); see also Report of the 
Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, Chapter VII: Privileges, immunities and facilities 
of the United Nations, chap. VII, § 1, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. PC/20 (Dec. 23, 1945), a legislative history in 
which the constitutions of Specialized Agencies were examined (explaining that “a number 
of specialized agencies are already in existence. Their constitutions, or the agreements under 
which they are set up, have for the most part detailed provisions with regard to 
privileges and immunities are to a large extent on the arrangements made between the League 
of Nations and the Swiss Government. These specialized agencies include the following: 
The International Monetary Fund (Article IX), the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development: (Article VII), United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(Resolutions Nos. 32, 34 and 36 of the first session of the Council), Food and Agriculture 
Organization (articles VIII and XV), European Central Inland Transport Organization (Article 
VIII, paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17). These provisions are on the same lines in each case, 
though in some instances they have been worked out ‘in more detail than in others’”).  
14  Preparatory Commission of the United Nations on Privileges and Immunities, Committee 5: 
Privileges and Immunities, U.N. DOC. PC/LEG/22 (Dec. 2, 1945) (“But if there is one 
certain principle it is that no member state may hinder in any way the working of the 
Organization or take any measures the effect of which might be to increase its burdens 
financial or other.”) [hereinafter Proceedings of Committee 5]. 
15  See study by Jan Wouters & Pierre Schmitt, Challenging Acts of Other United Nations’ Organs, Subsidiary 
Organs and Officials, 22–30 (Leuven Ctr. for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 
49, 2010). 
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a core constitutional matter; and in borderline cases, whether the UN has 
exercised a waiver. I conclude by suggesting that a more robust internal dispute 
resolution mechanism within the UN, rather than review by national courts, is the 
optimal outcome, and that UN member states should join the conversation about 
how private law disputes should be resolved today given the evolution of the UN’s 
mandate.   
The normative position against absolute U.N. immunity might be 
objectionable in light of two considerations: the U.N. is a notoriously cash-
strapped organization and lesser immunities may affect the willingness of member 
states to contribute to peacekeeping. After all, at present, any sums paid out for 
the settlement of mass torts claims must come from existing budgets because the 
U.N. is self-insured. Moreover, member states may object to using Organizational 
funds to compensate victims of mass torts as against their intent. The same 
reasoning has been used to argue in favor of charitable immunity: “the 
financial strains of liability would reduce—perhaps even destroy—a charity’s 
capacity to provide a valuable public benefit.”16 A second objection is that if the 
U.N. settles with private claimants or enters into dispute resolution processes 
that result in a finding that compensation is owed, it may have a chilling effect 
on the Organization. It is feared that acknowledging liability for harms in 
peacekeeping operations may set a precedent that will frighten off potential 
troop contributing countries (TCC) from future peacekeeping missions and 
hamper the U.N.’s ability to provide assistance in future emergency situations. 
The point made in this Article is that the present justification for absolute 
U.N. immunity, itself an exception to ordinary principles of responsibility, 
does not survive arguments from accountability, distribution, or economic 
efficiency. It is also questionable in light of existing doctrine: despite the broad 
wording of the CPIUN, Article 105 of the U.N. Charter limits the Organization’s 
external immunities before national courts to those functionally necessary. In case 
of conflict between the obligations of members under the U.N. Charter and other 
international instruments, Article 103 of the Charter takes precedence.17 
The U.N.’s present legal strategy of making overbroad determinations that 
mass torts are “not receivable” because they are public claims that involve 
questions of policy may have unintended consequences for the Organization. 
Dissatisfied with the U .N . ’ s  response, claimants are moving to national 
courts with greater frequency, inviting them to deconstruct existing categories 
of law and carve out exceptions from the existing immunity framework. It may 
only be a matter of time before a case with the right facts prompts a sympathetic 
judge to read down the U . N . ’ s  immunity, undermining the Organization’s 
                                                 
16  Quality of Mercy, supra note 11, at 1388 (internal citations omitted). 
17  U.N. Charter art. 103. 
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independence altogether. Such an eventuality would pose great risk to the future 
work of the United Nations. 
The 1945 decision of member states to accord the U.N. immunity involved 
a judgment about the U.N.’s relationship with individuals—one that assumed the 
U.N.’s primary beneficiaries were states. To contemporary eyes, however, this 
assumption appears outdated. Absolute U.N. immunity stands in contrast to the 
U.N.’s programmatic promotion of the Rule of Law and to the standards 
expected of nation states.18 Moreover, it is indicative of a significant asymmetry 
between U.N. responsibility and immunity. That is, while the U.N. routinely 
affects individuals in the contemporary execution of its mandate and accepts 
absolute responsibility for torts that occur during peacekeeping operations as a 
matter of longstanding institutional policy,19 its immunities h a v e  shielded it 
from any outside review of how those claims are addressed. Immunity protects 
the U.N. from national jurisdictions, but it should not protect it from 
responsibility. 
In Section I, I will describe the U . N . ’ s  current structure of 
immunities and distinguish between its external and internal immunities. I will 
also analyze the strategy of categorizing torts as public law claims, which led 
the U . N .  to reject the Kosovo Lead Poisoning and Haiti Cholera cases under the 
CPIUN. In Section II, I will set out the philosophical case against absolute U.N. 
immunity from accountability, distributive justice and economics perspectives. In 
Section III, I will argue that a broad but functional reading of immunities is 
sufficient for the U.N., while introducing the Mothers of Srebrenica case as a 
problematic example of operational necessity and, in contrast, the Congo case 
from 1964 as an early example of how the U.N. chose to responsibly settle a 
mass torts claim. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of the evolution 
of the U . N . ’ s  mandate and contemporary standards of accountability, and 
argue that U.N. member states should join the conversation about what 
standards of liability and judicial process should be expected of the U . N .  
today given its contemporary relationship with and impact on individuals. 
                                                 
18  See, for example, G.A. Res. 67/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/1 (Nov. 30, 2012); see also The 2013 
Rights Up Front Action Plan, written in response to the U.N.’s systematic failure in Sri Lanka, 
in which the U.N.  plans to “put [ ] the imperative to protect people, wherever they may be, at 
the heart of U.N. strategies and operational activities.” Action 3 further states: “On the ground, 
when people are at risk we will have actionable strategies that leverage our political, 
human rights, humanitarian and development capacities in a concerted manner.” RIGHTS UP 
FRONT: A PLAN OF ACTION TO STRENGTHEN THE U.N.’S ROLE IN PROTECTING PEOPLE IN CRISES, 
Follow-Up to the Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on U.N. Action in Sri Lanka, (July 
9, 2013) available at http://www.innercitypress.com/sriban1rightsupfronticp.pdf. 
19  See the discussion in Section II.A, infra. 
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II.  THE DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK OF U.N. IMMUNITIES 
This Article addresses U.N. immunities in the context of large torts claims. 
However, U.N. immunities may be implicated in a variety of other contexts as 
well. For example, the U .N.  is routinely faced with contract and employment 
disputes and has developed alternative fora for these types of third-party claims. 
An arbitration procedure is in place for contract disputes,20 and labor disputes 
are resolved through an internal administrative tribunal.21 When national 
authorities seek to investigate or prosecute U.N. staff or officials at the request of 
the Organization for criminal acts, the U . N .  has developed a procedure 
whereby it waives its immunity for the purpose of assisting national authorities, 
while reserving the right to assert immunity at the trial stage if a prosecution is 
pursued.22 It is also important to acknowledge that the U.N. regularly addresses 
private third-party claims against it, including simple torts claims.23 Most are 
handled by a nascent system of local claims review boards that are established 
within individual missions for torts claims under $50,000.24 What is missing, 
however, is a system for dealing with large torts claims by classes of private 
individuals against the U.N. who are not represented by a state. This is the 
subject of this Article, although its recommendations have implications for U.N. 
immunity in general. 
                                                 
20  U.N. Secretary-General, Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning 
of the United Nations: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/C.5/49/65 (Apr. 24, 1995) 
(discussing procedures in place for implementation of Art. VIII, sec. 29 of the CPIUN). 
21  See generally Cedric Ryngaert, The Immunity of International Organizations before Domestic Courts: Recent 
Trends, 7 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 121, 143 (2010). 
22  For example, the problem of sexual assault by peacekeepers resulted in a 2005 comprehensive 
strategy with implications for both accountability and immunities. See U.N. Secretary-General, 
A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations, U.N. Doc. A/59/710 (Mar. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Zeid Report], available at https:// 
cdu.unlb.org/Portals/0/Documents/KeyDoc5.pdf. 
23  Report of the Secretary-General commends these boards for being able to settle cases without 
having to “resort to the establishment of . . . a  standing claims commission.” U.N. Secretary-
General, supra note 2 0 , ¶ 17. An increasing number of complaints against the U.N. have made 
this system backlogged and delayed. 
24  U.N. Secretary-General, Financing of the United Nations Protection Force, the United Nations Confidence 
Restoration Operation in Croatia, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force and the United Nations 
Peace Forces Headquarters: Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operation—Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Rep. of the Secretary-
General, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/51/389 (Sept. 20, 1996) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General Financing 
Report 1996]. 
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A.  Rights,  Remedies, and Reasons for U.N. Immunity 
Under ordinary principles of torts law the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium 
applies: “Where there is a right, there is a remedy.” This principle holds true 
when an individual or entity causes harm, even when acting with the best of 
intentions. The general proposition can be stated thus: a rescuer who 
negligently causes harm to a victim owes the victim a duty to repair the harm.25 
The implementation of this principle is affected by the doctrine of 
immunity. Immunity does not alter the standard of legal liability. Rather it 
nullifies the consequences of liability in domestic courts for the tortfeasor.26 
This right is recognized by the U.N.’s own policies and practices, which 
permit individuals to bring claims against the Organization. The legal basis for 
third-party claims against the Organization comes from a 1996 report on the 
financing of U . N .  forces in Croatia, where the Secretary General 
acknowledged that the U . N . ’ s  responsibility for its torts derives 
from its international legal personality: 
The international responsibility of the United Nations for the activities 
of United Nations forces is an attribute of its international legal personality 
and its capacity to bear international rights and obligations . . . . The 
undertaking to settle disputes of a private law nature submitted against it 
and the practice of actual settlement of such third-party claims—although 
not necessarily according to the procedure provided for under the 
status-of-forces agreement—evidence the recognition on the part of the 
United Nations that liability for damage caused by members of United 
Nations forces is attributable to the Organization.27 
This right was subsequently integrated into the rules of the 
Organization by a comprehensive liability scheme in recognition of the 
U . N . ’ s  responsibility to compensate for mission-related deaths and injuries.28 
In a detailed General Assembly resolution, U.N. member states set out limits to 
the U.N.’s liability, but never disputed the premise that the U.N. has a duty to 
third parties for damage caused during peacekeeping operations.29 This 
                                                 
25  Waisman, supra note 8, at 644. 
26  Quality of Mercy, supra note 11, at 1387 (internal citations omitted). 
27  See generally U.N. Secretary-General Financing Report 1996, supra note 24, ¶¶ 6 & 8, 16–25; see also 
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, April 26–June 3, July 4–Aug. 12, 2011, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/637/Add.1, 63d Sess. (explaining that according to U.N. practice the U.N. assumes 
responsibility for the command and control missions, but not for UN-authorized peacekeeping). 
28  Pierre Bodeau-Livinec, Faux-Semblants de la Lex Specialis: L’Exemple de la Resolution 52/547 de 
L’Assemblée Generale des Nations Unies Sur Les Limitations Temporelles et Financières de la 
responsibility de L’ONU, 46 Revue Belge de Droit International 117 (2013) [hereinafter Faux-
Semblants].  
29  See t h e  discussion infra at notes 66, 68; see also Paul Szasz, The U . N .  Legislates to Limit its 
Liability, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 739 (1987) (noting that by enacting this scheme, U.N. member states 
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resolution forms the basis of a lex specialis, through which third parties can 
bring claims against the Organization.30 It also informs the internal system 
of immunities established under the CPIUN, which are discussed below.31 
To bring a claim in national courts, in contrast, individuals must overcome 
the U.N.’s very broad external immunities.32 A universal organization with a 
comprehensive mandate for peace, security, human rights, environmental, 
cultural, social, and economic affairs, the U.N. was, as Sabine von Schorlemer 
discusses, one of the most ambitious regulatory undertakings in international 
relations.33 Immunities were regarded as an inherent quality of the U.N.’s 
international legal personality and as a way of safeguarding the Organization from 
member states.34 Three rationales support the grant of extensive immunities to 
the U.N.: (i) safeguarding the U . N . ’ s  independence and unique function, (ii) 
its voluntary role as a Good Samaritan, and (iii) to absolve national courts of 
the need to judge issues of international diplomacy and policy. These arguments 
flow from the U.N.’s unique position in the international architecture, its 
                                                 
have prevented the U.N. from hiding behind its immunity for avoiding tort-related damages). 
30  Cf. Faux-Semblants, supra note 28, at 132 (arguing that the resolution clearly operates within the 
realm of international legal rules, but arguing the resolution may not be sufficiently precise to create 
a lex specialis). For commentary, see Kristen E. Boon, The Role of Lex Specialis in the Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organisations; Arnold Pronto, Reflections on the Scope of Application of the 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, in RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR IAN 135, 147 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed. 2013). 
31  See U.N. Secretary-General Financing Report 1996, supra note 2 4 , ¶ 20. As discussed in more 
detail below, however, the U.N. is immune under its internal procedures from public law claims. 
32  Proceedings of Committee 5, supra note 1 4 , at 4. For example, the legislative history of the 
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 provides: 
The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to 
determining the details of the application of the forgoing provisions 
or may propose conventions to the members of the Organization for 
this purpose.” The committee noted that “the draft article 
proposed .  .  .  does not specify the privileges and immunities respect 
for which it imposes on the member states. This has been thought 
superfluous. The terms . . . indicate in a general way all that could be 
considered necessary to the realization of the purposes of the 
Organization, to the free functioning of its organs and to the independent 
exercise of the functions and duties of their officials . . . . It would 
moreover have been impossible to establish a list valid for all the member 
states and taking account of the special situation in which some of them 
might find themselves by reason of the activities of the Organization or of 
its organs in their territory. But if there is one certain principle it is that no 
member state may hinder in any way the working of the Organization or take any 
measures the effect of which might be to increase its burdens, financial, or other. (emphasis 
added). 
33  SABINE VON SCHORLEMER, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 466 (2011). 
34  ICJ Reparation for Injuries Case, Advisory Opinion, supra note 7, at 183. 
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mandate to protect member states against threats to peace and security and 
provide assistance, and the inherently political context within which it works. 
The principal reason for granting the U.N. immunity from the 
administrative, adjudicatory and executive powers of member states is its 
unique function as a universal, multi-lateral organization with a mandate to 
maintain international peace and security. Without immunity, the U . N .  would 
be subject to pesky lawsuits, retaliatory acts by member states against its 
representatives and organs, and suits that could drain its resources.35 Indeed, 
cases have arisen in which member states attempted to impede the performance 
of U.N. staff or experts in the performance of their duties. In two such cases, 
the International Court of Justice was asked to render advisory opinions that 
resulted in findings that the immunity of the Organization should be upheld 
and the governments involved should refrain from interfering with U . N .  
officials performing their official duties.36 Because the U . N .  is a creature 
of its member states, immunities also ensure that individual members do not 
exercise extra-constitutional influence on the Organization.37 
The U . N . ’ s  humanitarian mandate constitutes a second 
justification for granting it immunity from suit. The U.N. is a major provider 
of emergency assistance and peacekeeping, and it has intervened in some way in 
95% of armed conflicts since the Cold War.38 It provides these services by 
consent and without charge.39 Moreover, it is the only universal organization 
                                                 
35  McKinnon Wood cautions against “cranks, fanatics or cantankerous people” who may believe 
either that they have a duty to compel the organization to adopt a particular course of action, or 
that they have suffered a wrong at its hands. HENRY G. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONAL LAW 1034 (2011) (citing McKinnon Wood, Legal Relations Between 
Individuals and A World Organization of States, 30 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y 143–44 (1944). 
36  Applicability of Article VI, § 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1989 I.C.J. 177 (Dec. 15); Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal 
Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 
I.C.J. 62 (Apr. 29). See also Immunity from Process of U . N .  Officials, Memorandum to the Deputy Chief 
de Cabinet, 1963 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 188, 189 (noting that U.N. officials may require immunity against 
their own states). 
37  August Reinisch, Introduction, in PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS RESEARCH HANDBOOK 134 (Jan Klabbers & Asa Wallendahl eds. 2011) (noting 
that forcing the U.N. to litigate in domestic courts might, for example, constitute an effort at 
indirect control). 
38  Results of a recent study entitled “The Multilateralization of Armed Conduct” conducted by 
Kristen Boon & Greg Fox (draft on file with author). 
39  See Chairman of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations “Brahimi Report”, ¶ 48 U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (August 21, 
2000). 
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that can provide peacekeeping functions on a global basis.40 Just as Good 
Samaritans41 are often granted some immunities in national jurisdictions to 
incentivize their altruistic behavior,42 the U.N. is granted reprieve from national 
courts. The U.N.’s purpose is to maintain international peace and security, but 
it is not required by any rule of international law to intervene in crisis 
situations. Indeed, efforts to attach a positive obligation for the U.N. to act in 
humanitarian crises, or, for example, to restrict the use of the veto, have 
been met with serious contestation.43 Immunity, therefore, might be justified as 
incentivizing the U.N.’s work. 
Third, and most significantly, given the U.N.’s international structure, 
national courts may not be well placed to judge its affairs. From the perspective 
of the integrity of international law, national courts may render divergent 
decisions on questions of public international law.44 Alternatively, national 
courts may either display bias against the Organization, whether due to simple 
differences in experience or culture, or prejudice against the international.45 Just 
as courts may refrain from taking jurisdiction over political questions in a 
national context on the basis that the issue is non-justiciable, claims involving 
the U . N . ’ s  internal policies or constitutional questions may be similarly 
inappropriate for national adjudication.46 Political grievances with the U . N .  
should not be resolved in domestic courts, and indeed, would seriously 
hamper the independence of the Organization. As Sir John Donaldson wrote: 
“it can rarely, if ever, be for judges to intervene where diplomats fear to tread.”47 
                                                 
40  Some regional organizations have peacekeeping functions, however they are limited by 
mandate, geography, and funds. Despite the growth of companies providing private military 
contractors, there is no serious case for a for-profit company that would take over 
peacekeeping operations. 
41  Luke 10:30–37 (reciting the parable of the Good Samaritan, the citizen of Samaria who helped a 
victim of robbery by taking him to a lodge and paying for his care). 
42  See generally Waisman, supra note 8. 
43  Jared Schott, Chapter VII as Exception: Security Council Action and the Regulative Ideal of Emergency, 
6 N.W. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 24, 38 (2007) (“Amongst the international legal community, 
it is widely accepted that a Council determination or inaction under Article 39 . . . is 
nonjusticiable.”). 
44 SCHERMERS, supra note 3 5 , at 1034 (citing McKinnon Wood, Legal Relations Between Individuals 
and A World Organization of States, 30 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y (for 1944) at 143–44). 
45 Id. 
46  See, for example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
47  R. v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commw. Affairs. ex p. Pirbhai (1985) 107 I.L.R. 461, MR at 
479 (Statement by Sir John Donaldson) (emphasis added). 
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B.  The Doctrine of U.N. Immunity 
In order to balance conflicting interests between the UN, its member 
states, and third parties, Article 105 of the U . N .  Charter limited 
immunities to those that were functionally necessary.48 This statement of 
principle on U.N. immunities was implemented by a general convention a few 
years later, whereby “the United Nations, its property and assets wherever 
located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of 
legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its 
immunity.”49 It is on the basis of this article of the CPIUN that courts have 
understood the U . N . ’ s  immunity to be absolute. As Wouters and Schmitt 
write,  
although national jurisdictions have hinted at the possibility that they could 
decide on the case if they had to apply the limited immunity based on Article 
105 of the U.N. Charter, they appear unanimously to fall back on Article 
II, Section 2 of the General Convention and accept the absolute immunity 
of the UN.50 
                                                 
48  Bruno Simma, et al., Introduction, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 
2161 (Bruno Simma et al. eds, 3d ed. 2012) (explaining that this is a principle found in all major 
status conventions and which was to become a fundamental rule of the entire system 
of international privileges and immunities). Fox and Webb contend that in order to determine 
the question whether jurisdictional immunity is applicable to an activity of an 
international organization, the question should be whether the activity was necessary for the 
effective functioning of the organization. HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE 
IMMUNITY 575 (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter FOX & WEBB]. See Klabbers, supra note 6, at 22–23 
(discussing functionalism, and describing it as a theory that addressed the relationship between 
the Organization and its members). 
49  CONVENTION ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS art. II, §  2 ,  
Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 (emphasis added).  
50  See generally Wouters & Schmitt, supra note 15, at 14. See also Manderlier v. United Nations and 
Belgian State, 45 I.L.R. 446 (Belg. Trib. of First Instance 1966):  
Article 105 of the San Francisco Charter . . . [a]ccords the United Nations only 
those privileges and immunities that are necessary to it for the fulfillment of 
its purposes. Those purposes, as enumerated in Article 1 of the Charter, do 
not include acts against private citizens such as are the subjects of the Plaintiff’s 
complaints. The provisions of Section 2 of the Convention are wider than those 
of Article 105 of the Charter. They grant a general immunity from 
jurisdiction and do not limit it to what necessity strictly demands for 
the fulfillment of the defendant’s purposes. These two international 
conventions have equal force, and the less widely drawn one cannot restrict 
the application of the more widely drawn one. 
Id. at 453.  Other cases that address the relationship between domestic law, Article 105 of the UN 
Charter and the CPIUN include: Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(determining domestic U.S. law was inapplicable to the question of whether the UN should be 
have absolute or restrictive immunity because that issue was governed by the CPIUN); Atkinson 
v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Consortium X v. Switzerland 
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Swiss Federal Supreme Court] July 2, 2004, ILDC 344; Firma 
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Although the U.N. Charter gave the General Assembly the power to make 
recommendations to implement Article 105 of the U.N. Charter, Article 2 is 
overbroad: it expands very broad functional immunity to absolute immunity from 
process.51 The U . N .  Charter has a constitution-like function, which is relevant 
to the interpretation of all other treaties,52 and as a matter of interpretation, the 
Charter’s reference to functional immunities must take precedence over 
inconsistent implementing treaties.53 
However, because immunity was not intended to shield the U . N .  from 
responsibility as a “good citizen” on the world stage, the CPIUN also required 
that the Organization respond to justifiable claims by third parties resulting from 
its activities or operations.54 As a result, the CPIUN creates external immunities 
from process before national courts under Article 2, while also setting up a 
more limited internal system of immunity that distinguishes between public and 
private claims under Article 29. In this internal system, the U . N .  is immune 
from public law claims. Article 29 provides: “The United Nations shall make 
provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of 
contracts or other disputes of a private law character to which the United Nations 
is a party.”55 
Identical terminology is included in the Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities for Specialized Agencies56 and in other instruments on IO privileges 
                                                 
Baumeister Ing. Richard L. v. O, Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Austrian Supreme Court], Dec. 
14, 2004, ILDC 362; Mothers of Srebrenica v. State of the Netherlands, Case No. 
200.022.151/01 (Neth.) (Dutch Court of Appeals in The Hague Mar. 30, 2010) (determining that 
Article 105 of the UN Charter did not take precedence over the CPIUN because it was within the 
scope of Article 105). The Mothers of Srebrenica March 2010 decision is available at 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Dutch%20cases/Appeals_Judgment_Mothers_Srebren
ica_EN.pdf. 
51  The U.N. Charter states that the  
[o]rganization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its 
purposes. . . . The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view 
to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this 
Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for 
this purpose.  
U . N .  Charter art. 105. 
52  Stefan Kadelbach, Interpretation of the U . N .  Charter, in T H E  C H A R T E R  O F  T H E  
U N I T E D  N A T I O N S :  A  C O M M E N T A R Y  71–99, 87 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2012). 
53  Cf. Klabbers, supra note 6 , at 14 (noting that functionalism can justify a near absolute reading 
of immunity if the survival of the organization is considered a functional necessity). 
54  Rashkow, supra note 9, at 333. 
55  Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. 8, § 29, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 
U.N.T.S. 15. 
56 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies art. 9, § 31, Nov. 21, 
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and immunities.57 
Indeed, it has been argued that the distinction between public and 
private law claims is relevant to the whole structure of the CPIUN in that the 
absolute immunity granted by Article 2 of the General Convention can be viewed 
as contingent on the Organization’s compliance with Article 29, which requires 
the U.N. to make available “appropriate modes of settlement” for private law 
claims.58 If the U.N. does not provide it, it has been argued that the U.N. is in 
material breach of the Convention, which would suspend its operation for the 
duration of the breach and hence lift immunities altogether.59 
Given the centrality of the public/private distinction in Article 29 to the 
U . N . ’ s  internal system of immunity, it is significant that there is no definition 
of either term in the CPIUN.60 Frédéric Mégret has noted that the criteria used 
by the U.N. to distinguish between public and private claims have been lodged 
in the “internal jurisprudence of the UN” and hence inaccessible to outsiders.61 
Despite this, there is some practice that is relevant. For example, one category 
of cases considered to be public law are those that implicate the operational 
                                                 
1947, 33 U.N.T.S. 261. 
57  See, for example, Headquarters Agreement between the Government of Canada and the ICAO art. 
7, § 30, Apr. 14, 1951, 96 U.N.T.S. 155; see also C. WILFRED JENKS, INTERNATIONAL 
IMMUNITIES 41–45 (1961) (commenting on the issue of international organizations’ immunity). 
58  Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations arts. 2, 8 ,  Feb. 13, 1946, 
1 U.N.T.S. 15. 
59  Transcript of Oral Argument at 16–17, Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp.3d 246, No. 13-
CV-7146 (JPO), available at http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Oral-Argument 
_Cholera-Case-10.23.pdf. I surmise that the reason this argument has not been availing is that 
suspension is a remedy to be invoked by a party to a treaty, rather than by individual claimants. 
Thanks to Larry Johnson and Pierre Hughes Verdier for stimulating discussions on this point. 
60  That same treaty’s drafting history sheds no further light on the matter, and the only dispute 
recorded with regards to the scope of the provision involved whether the U.N. should be 
obliged to purchase insurance in the event of traffic accidents by its staff. Proceedings of 
Committee 5, supra note 14. It is not clear that state practice would be of much help either: the 
definitions of public and private law disputes applicable in the state immunity context are not 
easily transposable to IOs. See, for example, ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS—
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 93 (1994) (“[T]o suggest that this distinction has 
any relevance to organizations is to assimilate them to states, which is not correct. Their basis 
of immunity is different. The relevant test under general international law is whether an 
immunity from jurisdiction to prescribe is necessary for the fulfillment of the organization’s 
purposes. That question cannot be answered by reference to whether it was, in respect of the 
matter under litigation, acting ‘in sovereign authority’ or ‘as a private person.’”). See also FOX & 
WEBB, supra note 48, at 574. 
61  Frédéric Mégret, La responsabilite des Nations Unies aux temps du cholera, 47(1) BELGIAN REV. INT’L L. 
161 (2013); see also Fault-Lines: Haiti in a Time of Cholera, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 2, 2015), available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/faultlines/2013/08/2013828102630903134.html. 
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functioning of the UN, which go to the public heart of the organization.62 A 
second category of public law claims are those that are “based on political or 
policy-related grievances against the U.N.,” such as those related to actions 
or decisions of the Security Council or General Assembly.63 
The definition of disputes of a private law nature, in contrast, were 
clarified by a 1995 report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, 
which identified two categories: (i) commercial agreements that the U . N .  
has entered into64; and (ii) claims by third parties for personal injury, death, 
or property loss or damage, specifically as caused by actions of U . N .  
peacekeepers.65 The definition of private law claims clearly encompassed 
third- party claims against the Organization for death or personal injury 
occurring during peacekeeping missions. Although the U.N. limits its liability 
financially and temporally, including by carving out injuries that occur as a result 
of operational necessity, the right of individuals to a remedy for injuries has been 
acknowledged by the U.N.  for decades.66 To put it otherwise, the U.N. has a 
duty of care towards third parties that is grounded in the internal rules of the 
Organization, as per Article 5 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (and the 1986 Convention on Treaties Concluded between States 
and International Organizations that is not yet in force). These internal 
rules have developed into subsequent practices of the Organization. 
C. Cases Deemed “[N]ot [R]eceivable” Under the CPIUN 
The possibility that the U .N.  committed torts against large numbers of 
peoples has been raised in two recent cases: the Kosovo Lead Poisoning and Haiti 
Cholera cases. Both received a similar response from the UN: that the claims 
were not of a private law nature and hence “not receivable” under the 
CPIUN. In the next section, I will outline the circumstances of these cases 
and argue these were in fact private law matters, and not claims involving 
public law as decided by the U.N. As a result, within the U.N.’s internal system, 
there was no immunity. 
                                                 
62  U.N. Secretary-General Financing Report 1996, supra note 24, ¶ 13 (defining the term “operational 
necessity” as “necessary actions taken by a peacekeeping force in the course of carrying out its 
operations in pursuance of its mandates”) (internal citation omitted). 
63  U.N. Secretary-General, Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning 
of the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/C.5/49/65 (Apr. 
24, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Secretary-General Report]. 
64  U.N. Secretary-General Financing Report 1996, supra note 24 ,  ¶ 16; see also 1995 Secretary-
General Report, supra note 63, ¶¶ 15–16. 
65  U.N. Secretary-General Financing Report 1996, supra note 24 ,  ¶ 16; see also 1995 Secretary-
General Report, supra note 63, ¶¶ 15–16. 
66  See discussion of G.A. Res. 52/247, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/247 (Jul. 17, 1998), infra note 68 and 
accompanying text. 
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1 .  Kosovo. 
In the Kosovo Lead Poisoning case, three temporary camps created to house 
internally displaced Roma peoples after the 1999 NATO intervention were 
determined to be contaminated with very high levels of lead. The camps, 
set up near the Trepča mines, a sprawling complex of forty mining facilities 
that had notoriously lax environmental standards, hosted toxic slag heaps that 
filled the air with toxic lead dust and contaminated the soil in which local crops 
were grown. The camps were operational for over five years, despite repeated 
statements by U .N .  officials that the camps would be closed, and  random 
World Health Organization testing indicated that all children under the age of six 
had life-threatening levels of lead in their blood.67 
This claim was brought by private claimants to the U.N. under a procedure 
established by General Assembly Resolution 52/24768 within six months from 
the time of the injury, asking for compensation and remedies for economic 
losses. The U.N. rejected the claim on July 25, 2011, stating by letter that the 
claims “do not constitute claims of a private law character and, in essence, 
amount to a review of the performance of UNMIK’s mandate . . . therefore, 
the claims are not receivable.”69 The U.N.’s response gave no explanation for 
why these were deemed to be public law claims, other than to note that 
the claims “alleged widespread health and environmental risks arising in the 
context of the precarious security situation in Kosovo.”70 In a more recent 
communication addressing the U.N.’s position on private torts claims generally, 
the U.N. added the following justification for its rejection of the Kosovo claim: 
The claims were considered by the Organization not to be of a private 
law character since they amounted to a review of the performance of 
UNMIK’s mandate as an interim administration, as UNMIK retained the 
discretion to determine the modalities for the implementation of its interim 
administration mandate, including the establishment of IDP camps.71 
The U . N . ’ s  letter suggests that the matter involved public health and 
common goods, responsibilities typically carried out by states in their sovereign 
functions. Furthermore, the precariousness of the security situation created an 
emergency-like situation, which implicated the U.N.’s mandate over international 
                                                 
67  ALEKSANDAR MOMIROV, ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL 
ADMINISTRATIONS: A PUBLIC LAW APPROACH 3 (2011). 
68  G.A. Res. 52/247, ¶ 9 U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/247 (Jul. 17, 1998). The Resolution limits the 
amount of compensation payable per individual to 50,000 USD save for “exceptional 
circumstances.” Id. 
69  O’Brien Letter to Post, supra note 3. 
70  Id. 
71  Pedro Medrano Letter, supra note 5, ¶ 93. 
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peace and security. The U .N . ’ s  role in Kosovo at the time is relevant: since 
1999 the U.N. has acted as temporary administrator in Kosovo and, at the time 
of events, was operating in an exceptional, quasi-governmental position with 
control over territory and peoples. By choosing to put the camp in that 
particular location, however, the U . N .  introduced the harm to that population. 
While the camps might, in the short term, have fallen within the scope of 
operational necessity, it is not clear why they continued to be categorized as such, 
given the widespread knowledge of the problem and the five year delay in 
moving the population.72 
2 .  Haiti. 
A second example of a claim deemed “not receivable” by the U .N .  
involves the introduction of cholera into Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, which 
led to over 7,500 deaths.73 As the New York Times reported in a front page article 
in May 2012: 
Lightning fast and virulent, it spread from here through every Haitian 
state, erupting into the world’s largest cholera epidemic despite a huge 
international mobilization still dealing with the effects of the Jan. 12, 
2010, earthquake . . . . Epidemiologic and microbiologic evidence strongly 
suggests that United Nations peacekeeping troops from Nepal imported 
cholera to Haiti, contaminated the river tributary next to their base through 
a faulty sanitation system and caused a second disaster.74 
The cause of the cholera outbreak in Haiti was almost certainly linked to 
the system of black-water disposal from latrines at a base of the U .N.  Mission 
in Haiti (MINUSTAH), where Nepali peacekeepers were stationed.75 Human 
waste was issued directly into one of the main water sources of the country, 
which then affected the water and food supply of a large segment of the Haitian 
population. Pursuant to U . N .  screening guidelines, peacekeepers need not 
                                                 
72  See, for example, Report to the United Nations Secretary-General by Kai Eide, A Comprehensive 
Review of the Situation in Kosovo, 11, ¶ 54 U . N .  Doc. S/2005/635 (Oct. 7, 2005) (describing 
the situation as an “emergency”). 
73  Georges v. United Nations, No. 13-CV-07146 (JPO); Laventure v. United Nations, No. 14-
CV-1611 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 11, 2014), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/ 
documents/1073738-140311-laventure-v-un-filed-complaint-2.html. 
74  Deborah Sontag, In Haiti, Global Failures on a Cholera Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2012, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/world/americas/haitis-cholera-outraced-the-
experts-and-tainted-the-un.html. 
75  ALEJANDRO CRAVIOTO, CLAUDIO F. LANATA, DANIELE S. LANTAGNE, & G. BALAKRISH NAIR, 
FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL OF EXPERTS ON THE CHOLERA OUTBREAK IN 
HAITI 3 (2012), available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/UN-cholera-report-
final.pdf; DANIELE LANTAGNE, G. BALAKRISH NAIR, CLAUDIO F. LANATA, & ALEJANDRO 
CRAVIOTO, THE CHOLERA OUTBREAK IN HAITI: WHERE AND HOW DID IT BEGIN? 
(2013), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23695726. 
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be screened for cholera, even if they come from regions in which the disease is 
present.76 Since the outbreak, Haiti has had the highest number of cases of 
cholera in the world for three years in a row, and cholera has since spread to 
parts of the Dominican Republic and Mexico.77 
In 2012, a Boston based group called the Institute for Justice and 
Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) filed a trail-blazing class action against the U.N. 
on behalf of over 5,000 plaintiffs. The petition asks for compensation for the 
victims ($50,000 for injured and $100,000 for deceased), better water sanitation, 
and a public acknowledgement of responsibility.78 IJDH alleged that the cholera 
outbreak violated Haitian law and certain international obligations, such as the 
right to life.79 The U.N. took the position that the claims in the Haiti case were 
of a public or policy law nature, writing: 
With respect to the claims submitted, consideration of these claims 
would necessarily include a review of political and policy matters. 
Accordingly, these claims are not receivable pursuant to Section 29 of 
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations, adopted by the General Assembly on 13 February 1946.80 
The letter did not provide reasons for why the claim should be considered 
a public or policy matter, as opposed to a private matter, which, pursuant to 
Section 29 of the CPIUN, would trigger an obligation for the U.N. to “make 
provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of . . . disputes of a private law 
character to which the United Nations is a party.”81 
In 2013, the Haiti Cholera case moved to U.S. courts, with the plaintiffs 
filing the case Georges et al v. U . N .  in the SDNY. The U.S. filed a Statement 
of Interest at the invitation of the Court upholding the U.N.’s absolute 
immunity under Article 2 of the CPIUN.82 In the spring of 2014, two new class 
                                                 
76  UNITED NATIONS, MEDICAL SUPPORT MANUAL FOR UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS (2d ed. 
1999) available at http://www.who.int/cholera/technical/prevention/choleratravelandtradeadvice 
231110.pdf. The U.N. follows World Health Organization guidelines, which does not advise 
routine screening of travelers from cholera-affected areas. Id.  
77  Id. 
78  See Randal C. Archibold & Somini Sengupta, U.N. Struggles to Stem Haiti Cholera Epidemic, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/world/americas/ 
un-struggles-to-stem-haiti-cholera-epidemic.html. 
79 See Submission for the 112th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, October 8 
& 9, 2014, ¶ 2 (Sept. 12, 2014), available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/ 
Shared%20Documents/HTI/INT_CCPR_CSS_HTI_18250_E.pdf. 
80  O’Brien Letter to Post, supra note 3. 
81  Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. 8, § 29, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 
U.N.T.S. 15. 
82  Georges v. United Nations, No. 13-CV-7146 (JPO), (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 7, 2014) (Statement of 
Interest for the U.S. Government), available at http://personal.crocodoc.com/J4lRXpi. 
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actions were filed in the EDNY and the SDNY, respectively, with similar legal 
theories and overlapping class members.83 In a January 2015 decision, the 
SDNY upheld the U . N . ’ s  absolute immunity in Georges et al on the 
basis that the U . N .  is absolutely immune under the CPIUN absent express 
waiver.84 No alternative mode of settlement was provided. 
In a February 19, 2015 letter to members of the U.S. Congress, however, 
the Secretary General has further attempted to justify this designation, and in so 
doing, redefined the scope of private law claims. The Secretary General 
explained: 
In the practice of the Organization, disputes of a private law character 
have been understood to be disputes of the type that arise between private 
parties, such as, claims arising under contracts, claims relating to the use 
of private property in peacekeeping contexts or claims arising from motor 
vehicle accidents . . . . [ T]he claims in question were not receivable pursuant 
to Section 29(a) of the General Convention [as they] raised broad issues 
of policy that arose out of the functions of the United Nations as an 
international organization, they could not form the basis of a claim of a 
private law character . . . . For the same reason, it was determined that 
these claims were not of the type for which a claims commission is 
provided under the SOFA, since the relevant provision of the SOFA 
also relates to claims of a private law character.85 
A November 2014 letter from the U.N.’s Senior Cholera Coordinator 
reinforces the U.N.’s restrictive new interpretation of private law claims: 
In the Practice of the Organization, disputes of a private law character 
have been understood to be disputes of the type that arise between two 
private parties. Section 29(a) has most frequently been applied to claims 
arising under contracts between the United Nations and a private party, 
to those relating to the use of property in the context of a mission away 
from Headquarters, and to claims arising from vehicle accidents.86 
                                                 
83  Complaint, Laventure v. United Nations, No. 14-CV-1611 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 11, 2014), 
available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1073738-140311-laventure-v-un-filed-
complaint-2.html; Complaint, Jean-Robert v. United Nations, No. CV-01-545, (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 
6, 2014). 
84  Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp.3d 246, 2015 WL 129657, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding 
the U . N .  is immune from suit absent express waiver, and waiver is not an issue in this case; 
to the contrary, the U.N. has repeatedly asserted its immunity). This decision has been appealed 
by the plaintiffs. At the time of writing, the decision had not been handed down. 
85  Letter from U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki- m oon to Members of United States Congress 
(Feb. 19, 2015), available at personal.crocodoc.com/9R2WJG8. 
86  Pedro Medrano Letter, supra note 5, ¶ 87. Also of interest in this letter are suggested criteria 
for evaluating claims:  
[W]hen assessing a claim under Section 29(a), the Organization does not 
rely solely on the allegations of the claim itself, but also assesses the character 
of the claim in the context of all its circumstances. The mere allegation of 
tortious conduct does not make a claim one of a private law character. The 
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What is striking about these documents is that torts—other than those 
arising from motor vehicle accidents— have been eliminated from the scope of 
the U . N . ’ s  duty to compensate for private injury. The Secretary General’s 
decision was taken without explanation or public consultation, and has 
resulted in a vastly curtailed definition of private law claims. This categorical 
elimination of torts other than those arising from motor vehicle accidents 
is significant: injuries are predictable aspects of any peacekeeping operation, and 
they should not be designated as public or policy law claims simply because 
they affect the U . N . ’ s  potential liability. This curtailment of the private law 
category is in tension with the doctrine of legitimate expectations. Had the UN 
settled the three torts cases at issue and then announced a change of policy, it 
would be less remarkable. As it stands, these jurisdiction-stripping measures rub 
up against the legitimate expectations of individuals affected by its mandates. 
In parallel, the Secretary General suggested an enlarged category of public 
law claims for which the U . N .  would be internally immune. The 2014 
letter to the Human Rights Special Rapporteurs on the Haiti Cholera case states, 
“Claims under Section 29(a) are distinct from public law claims, which are 
understood as claims that would arise between an individual and a public 
authority such as a State.”87 The letter goes on to suggest that “[o]n the 
international level, these claims may be addressed in various ways, such as 
through political, diplomatic or other means, including a body established for 
that specific purpose.”88 
Despite the U.N.’s position that the Haiti and Kosovo claims are public or 
policy matters, and therefore “not receivable” within the U.N.’s internal system, 
each appears to involve elements of a private law dispute from which the U.N. 
would not be immune. The plaintiffs were represented by NGOs, not states, and 
asked for compensation for personal injury and the death of the petitioners’ next-
of-kin. The claims were based on allegations involving the U.N.’s negligence and 
“grounded liability, at least in part, in domestic civil law.”89 Both the Kosovo and 
the Haiti claims appear to fall explicitly within the category of torts claims 
                                                 
nature of the duty allegedly owed by the Organization, the nature of the 
conduct or activity at issue, and other relevant circumstances are all pertinent 
to determining whether the claim involves a dispute of a private law 
character.”  
 Id. ¶ 90. 
87  Id. ¶ 88. 
88  Id.  
89  KATERINA LUNDAHL, THE REMEDY GAP: A REMEDIAL PERSPECTIVE TO THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS IN 
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS FROM SREBRENICA TO HAITI 30 (2014). 
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recognized by the U . N .  in other contexts as claims of a private law character 
related to peacekeeping operations.90  
In conclusion, what is currently lacking within the U . N .  system is a 
mechanism for addressing high-value torts cases brought by classes of private 
law claimants. In theory, a mechanism exists under the U . N .  Status of Forces 
Agreements (SOFAs), signed by the U . N .  and the recipients of peacekeeping 
forces. SOFAs contain a standard clause that provides for a third-party claims 
procedure before a standing claims commission for disputes of a private-law 
character.91 Despite a 1997 Secretary-General Report praising this model because 
the “UN should not act as its own judge,” 92 no such commission has ever been 
established in any context,93 although a local review board has processed other 
requests for compensation in Haiti.94 Regardless, it is not clear that claimants in 
mass torts cases would view this model as fair, as the interests of the host state 
who requests its establishment may conflict with the interests of individual 
claimants.95  
III.  THE CASE AGAINST ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY 
There are two main types of immunity: immunity rationae persona 
and immunity rationae materiae. According to the first model of immunity, 
everything the actor does is by definition public, and therefore immune. 
Immunity rationae materiae, in contrast, is based on functionalism and 
distinguishes between the actor and subject matter (or conduct). In the case of 
                                                 
90  See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. 8, § 29, supra note 55 
and accompanying text. 
91  See for example, Agreement Concerning the Status of the United Nations Operation in Haiti, 
U.N.-Haiti, ¶ 55, Jul. 9, 2004, 2271 U.N.T.S. 235 (“Except as provided in paragraph 57, any dispute 
or claim of a private-law character, not resulting from the operational necessity of MINUSTAH, 
to which MINUSTAH or any member thereof is a party and over which the courts of Haiti do 
not have jurisdiction because of any provision of the present Agreement shall be settled 
by a standing claims commission to be established for that purpose.”). The language is taken 
from the Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peace-keeping Operations, G.A. Res. 45/594, 
¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/45/594, (Oct. 9, 1990). 
92  G.A. Res. 51/903, U.N. Doc. A/51/903 (May 21, 1997), at 4. 
93  Rashkow, supra note 9, at 340. 
94  In 2009, the U.N. provided compensation for a torts claim in Haiti on an ex gratia basis. Interoffice 
memorandum to the Controller, Assistant Secretary- General, Office of Programme Planning, Budgets and 
Accounts, regarding ex gratia payment to an injured civilian Haitian, 2009 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 428–30 
(2009). 
95  Patrick J. Lewis, Who Pays for the United Nations' Torts?: Immunity, Attribution, and "Appropriate 
Modes of Settlement", 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 259, 272–273 (2014). The local boards have 
also been criticized for a lack of transparency and incompatibility with fair process, given that one 
party to the dispute also acts as the adjudicator. 
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U.N. immunities, functionalism is explicitly advanced by Article 105 of the U.N. 
Charter, inherent in the relationship between Articles 2 and 29 of the CPIUN, 
and relevant to the obligation to settle disputes of a private law nature in Article 
29. As argued above, the U.N.’s immunities are properly understood as very 
broad but functional and hence subject to limitation, although national courts 
have appeared to conclude that the U.N. is immune because it is the U.N. (rationae 
personae).96 
Despite the U.N.’s unique status in the international architecture, the 
presumption that the U.N. should be immune from all forms of suit before 
domestic courts was always problematic. Faced with few precedents to draw 
from, the drafters of the CPIUN imported the concept of absolute immunity 
of states.97 Even IO charters that did not contain express provisions providing 
immunity for every form of suit benefited from the analogy to state immunity: 
courts reasoned either that immunity should be granted on the basis that IOs are 
composed of sovereign states, each of which is immune from local jurisdiction, 
or that customary international law grants immunity to all IOs.98  
Today, it appears that the absolute immunity of the U . N .  is “stuck in 
time.” Codified by treaties that reflected a belief about the U.N.’s needs in 
1945, the U.N. ’ s  immunity has not matured and narrowed with practice the 
way that the immunities of states and diplomats have.99 Absolute immunity is 
anachronistic in most other fields, and it is not clear why the status quo has 
                                                 
96  For example, in the Mothers of Srebrenica case, discussed in more detail infra Section III.D, the 
U . N .  invoked its immunity under the Convention while the plaintiffs argued that its immunity 
should be restricted on the basis of Article 105 of the Charter. Both the Dutch Court of 
Appeals and Supreme Court upheld the U . N . ’ s  absolute immunity, emphasizing that 
its immunity was necessary for the realization of the U . N . ’ s  objectives in general, not 
just in that particular case. See discussion, infra notes 166–73 and accompanying text. 
97  REINISCH, supra note 1 3 , at 1 (“The Covenant of the League of Nations of 28 June 1919 
merely provided for ‘diplomatic’ privileges and immunities of its employees and the inviolability of 
its property. Only a subsequent agreement with the League’s host State, the so-called modus 
vivendi, stipulated that the League possessed international personality and capacity and that it 
could not ‘in principle, according to the rules of international law, be sued before the Swiss 
Courts without its consent.’”) (citing Communications du Conseil Fédéral Suisse Concernant 
le Régime des Immunités Diplomatique du Personnel de la Société des Nations et du 
Bureau International du Travail, League of Nations-Switz, Sept. 18, 1926, 7 O.J.L.N. (1926), 
annex 911a, 1422). 
98  SCHERMERS, supra note 35, at n.234. 
99  Rosa Freedman, U . N .  Immunity or Impunity? A Human Rights Based Challenge, 25 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 239, 242 (2014) (“State immunity is an evolving concept, while international 
organizations’ immunity is usually enshrined within treaties. This restricts the extent to which 
such immunity can be interpreted or evolve.”). 
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persisted with regards to IOs.100 Indeed, even bodies of the U .N.  such as the 
International Law Commission have advocated the narrowing of immunities in 
the contexts of state immunity and state officials’ immunity from foreign 
criminal jurisdictions.101 In the recent Germany v. Italy102 decision before the 
International Court of Justice, the vitality of the restrictive immunity doctrine 
was recognized, even though the court held that jus cogens norms do not prevent 
states from claiming immunity.103 
The threshold problem with the position that the U . N .  is absolutely 
immune is that it severs the ordinary legal principle that an organization is 
responsible for the harm it causes by its negligence from the principle that 
its victims have a right to a remedy.104 In other words, despite the U.N.’ s  
humanitarian mission, injury or loss of life for the victims of U.N. action is no 
less grievous when caused by the U.N. rather than by another actor. This is 
particularly true when the harm is introduced in the course of a negligent rescue. 
The U.N. Security Council has broad discretion under Chapter VII to 
decide whether and how to help at-risk populations. Although it sometimes 
decides to do nothing, these decisions are considered non-justiciable.105 Yet, just 
as the majority view holds that a Good Samaritan has no obligation to act,106 
one who undertakes to perform a rescue is bound to exercise reasonable care in 
doing so.107 When the U . N .  intervenes certain duties attach to the U . N . ,  
                                                 
100  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2001); Steven Herz, 
International Organizations in U.S. Courts: Reconsidering the Anachronism of Absolute Immunity, 31 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 471 (2008); Don Mayer, Sovereign Immunity and the Moral Community, 2 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 411 (1992). 
101  The International Law Commission of the U . N .  has, for example, advocated restrictive 
immunity for states and state officials. See U.N. Int’l Law Commission, Immunity of State Officials 
from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/4_2.shtml; Burkhard 
Hess, The International Law Commission's Draft Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and 
Their Property, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 269 (1993). 
102  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99 (Feb. 3, 2012), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf; see also THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 196 (August Reinisch ed. 2013) 
(discussing the distinction between state and International Organization immunity). 
103  Id. at ¶ 64. 
104  Quality of Mercy, supra note 11, at 1387. 
105  Monika Hakimi, Toward a Legal Theory of the Responsibility to Protect, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 257 
(2014). 
106  Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case Of Required Rescue, 89 GEO. L.J. 605, 609, 
611 (2001) (noting that in civil law jurisdictions, there is a positive duty to act, but in common 
law, there is no duty to act; rather, immunities protect the individual from criminal charges). 
107  Waisman, supra note 8, at 618–619. 
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as they would to any other rescuer.108 These duties are derived from general 
principles of law and have been acknowledged in the U.N.’s policies to 
compensate for ordinary negligence.109 In cases of gross negligence, the U.N. has 
decided that no financial limits apply.110 
The finding that the U.N.’s absolute immunity should be upheld even 
when individuals are left in a worse position than they were in before the U.N. 
intervened is problematic. From an accountability perspective, immunity 
undermines the responsibility of the UN.111 From a distributive perspective, 
immunity shifts the burdens to victims, rather than distributing them amongst 
those who benefit from the U.N.’s services. From an economic perspective, 
absolute immunity does not encourage efficient action such as incentivizing 
measures to avoid or minimize damage. In the next sections, I explore why the 
principled reasons to support absolute U.N. immunity are thin and why it is time 
to revert to a functional understanding of U.N. immunities. 
A.  The Case from Accountabili ty 
Power entails accountability and creates a duty to account for its exercise.112 
Where the U.N. is responsible for tortious harms arising out of its acts or 
omissions, it has a duty to account for its wrongs. This is a principle the U.N. 
accepts as a matter of course,113 and in many instances the U . N .  does address 
third- party claims in a responsible manner.114 In the mass torts cases addressed 
                                                 
108  Murphy, supra note 106, at 622 (arguing that persons are liable in tort for a failure to rescue where 
there is a positive course of action undertaken.  By analogy, the UN has a duty to rescue based on 
its mandate towards the peoples in areas with peacekeeping operations.). 
109  Report of the Secretary-General, Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 140(a), U.N. Doc. A/51/903 
¶ 13 (May 21, 1997). 
110  Id. ¶ 14 (noting that no financial limitations are proposed with regard to claims arising as a result 
of gross negligence or willful misconduct). 
111  Here, the distinction between accountability and responsibility is important: accountability is a 
political concept, which focuses on improving institutional mechanisms such as transparency, 
independent reporting and evaluation mechanisms, financial review, and broader rights 
of participation. In contrast, responsibility is legal and derives from the Rules of Responsibility 
in international law. See Kristen E. Boon, New Directions in Responsibility, 37 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 1, 5 (2011), available at http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-37-boon-new-directions-in-
responsibility.pdf. 
112  INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS: 
FINAL REPORT 5 (Berlin Conference 2004) [hereinafter I.L.A. Final Report], available at 
http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/6B708C25-4D6D-42E2-8385DADA752815E8. 
113  SCHERMERS, supra note 35, at n.257 (citing U.N. Juridical Yearbook for instances in which the 
U.N. accepted responsibility). 
114  See discussion of existing third- party claims mechanisms, supra notes 20–24 and 
accompanying text. 
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in this study, however, the U.N. made the internal assessment that the cases fell 
into the public law category and that the U.N. is internally immune, and then 
asserted its external immunity in subsequent cases brought in national courts.115 
An accountability gap has ensued: the finding that these claims were properly 
designated as public is open to challenge, but there is no alternative venue 
to bring a claim. Moreover, reasons for the designations were brief or 
forthcoming later through a different process with different actors.116 In a 
2004 report of the International Law Association, the Accountability Group 
found that such circumstances can amount to a denial of justice, which creates 
separate grounds for international responsibility.117 
One powerful accountability-based argument against absolute IO 
immunity proceeds from human rights and is based on counterbalancing IO 
immunity with an individual’s right to a remedy. The now famous Waite and 
Kennedy118 decision of 1999, which involved a request by independent contractors 
at the European Space Agency for access to a remedy pursuant to an 
employment dispute, exemplifies this approach. In its judgment, the European 
Court of Human Rights found that the availability of “reasonable alternative 
means to protect effectively [claimants] rights” under Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights were required.119 It has been argued that the same 
rationale should apply to other torts cases. As Freedman writes in the context of 
the Haiti  Cholera case: 
individuals affected by the cholera outbreak in Haiti have been prevented 
from accessing the local claims board or other alternative modes of 
settlement. If the U.N. is granted absolute immunity from jurisdiction, then 
the Haitian individuals will not be able to realize their rights to access a court 
and to a remedy.120 
Numerous other instruments, including the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the European Convention on Human Rights, and customary 
international law, guarantee this right.121 Determining whether the right has been 
                                                 
115  The Srebrenica case was not brought to the U . N . ’ s  claims unit, hence no “public” 
law determination was made in that case. 
116  I.L.A. Final Report, supra note 112, at 13 (“Organs of an IO should state the reasons for their 
decisions or particular courses of action whenever necessary for the assessment of their proper 
functioning or otherwise relevant from the point of view of their accountability.”). 
117  Id. at 33 (“A total lack of remedies would amount to a denial of justice, giving rise to a separate 
ground for responsibility on the part of the IO.”). 
118  Waite and Kennedy v. Germ., App. No. 26083/94, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 261 (1999). 
119  See, for example, id.; Beer and Regan v. Germ., App. No. 28934/95, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. 19 (1999). 
120  Freedman, supra note 99, at 253. 
121  Id. at 250. 
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satisfied, however, involves an inquiry into reasonable alternative means, and 
current case law is not extensive enough to provide a clear guide on how 
detailed that inquiry should be. Nonetheless, the door is ajar to human rights 
claims, and it accompanies a growing chorus that the U.N. is bound by 
international human rights and that it must be accountable for its actions, both in 
terms of procedural rights of access and substantive remedies.122 If effective 
means of redress are unavailable within the U.N. system, it may lead to a situation 
where member states are constitutionally unable to uphold the U.N.’s immunities, 
because they conflict with the U.N.’s own human rights norms.123 
This is the standard argument against absolute U.N. immunity, and I do 
not disagree with it. Nonetheless, I will suggest t h a t  there are two other 
powerful reasons why, from a normative perspective, absolute immunity 
should be reconsidered: distributive justice and economic incentives. 
B.  The Case from Distributive Justice 
Injuries are a predictable cost of any U . N .  peacekeeping operation. 
Sometimes these involve routine traffic accidents or slip- and- fall injuries. 
Other times, the losses are much greater. This Article has assumed that a 
corrective justice approach animates the need to compensate victims of U.N. 
malfeasance. That is to say, those who act negligently should compensate those 
they have injured, and that principle applies to the U . N .  as much as any 
other tortfeasor.124  
The principle that the U . N .  should compensate for risks it introduces 
can also be justified under principles of distributive justice.125 All U . N .  
member states benefit from the U . N . ’ s  mandate of maintaining international 
peace and security. As a result, it can be argued t h a t  a l l  member states 
share the burden of compensating for instances of the Organization’s negligence. 
The argument for collective responsibility is particularly strong in cases of social 
risk such as diseases like Cholera. 
From a fairness perspective, the position that victims should bear the 
burden of U . N .  malfeasance undermines the principle of distributive 
justice. As Thomas Franck argued, the role of law is to create systems that take 
                                                 
122  Id. at 251. 
123  For background, see Kristen Boon, The ECJ’s New Appeal Judgment on Kadi, available at 
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/07/25/the-ecjs-new-appeal-judgment-on-kadi/. 
124  John Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds of Justice, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1027, 1054 
(2002) (arguing that the U.S. government is no different from a private tortfeasor in its 
obligation to compensate for negligent acts, and citing the Teton Dam disaster). On a corrective 
justice approach to tort law generally, see DAN DOBBS,  LAW OF TORTS 17 (2000). 
125  Culhane, supra note 124, at 1092. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 368 Vol. 16 No. 2 
into account solutions to moral issues of distributive justice. Laws that unfairly 
allocate costs or risks are likely to provoke resistance, even from those who 
benefit.126 Most U . N .  interventions have multiple beneficiaries. Principles 
of loss distribution suggest that victims should not bear the costs of mishaps 
alone, but rather that a general appropriation from the Organization or all states 
is a more transparent and just mechanism for allocating resources to those 
who are harmed. 
This leads to the related question of whether paying out on third-party claims 
would inhibit the ability of the U.N. to continue to provide peacekeeping services. 
The effect of settlements w i t h  p a s t  v i c t i m s  on the future work of the 
Organization implies the inter-generational aspect of the U.N.’s work. 
Specifically, it raises the issue of whether accidental losses that result from U.N. 
Peacekeeping operations should be shared by past victims and future 
beneficiaries. 
Importantly, risk allocation was an eventuality the U .N .  considered when 
developing its internal liability regime in 1995: 
The limitation on the liability of the Organization as a means of allocating 
the risks of peacekeeping operations between the United Nations and host 
States is premised on the assumption that consensual peacekeeping 
operations are conducted for the benefit of the country in whose territory 
they are deployed, and that having expressly or implicitly agreed to the 
deployment of a peacekeeping operation in its territory, the host country 
must be deemed to bear the risk of the operation and assume, in part at 
least, liability for the damage arising from such an operation. As a practical 
matter, limiting the liability of the Organization is also justified on the 
ground that the funds from which third-party claims are paid are public 
funds contributed by the States Members of the United Nations for the 
purpose of financing activities of the Organization as mandated by those 
Member States. To the extent that funds are used to pay third-party claims, lesser 
amounts may be available to finance additional peacekeeping or other United Nations 
operations.127 
This policy balances risks between the host country and the U.N. and also 
sets caps on the U.N.’s liability. This practice of risk distribution and liability 
caps is used in other civil liability regimes, such as oil pollution, to make sure that 
adequate compensation is available to individuals who suffer harms.128 In 
addition to sharing burdens between host states and the U . N .  itself, however, 
                                                 
126  Thomas Franck, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 8 (1995). 
127  1995 Secretary General Report, supra note 63 (emphasis added). 
128  See, for example, 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), 
Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/List 
OfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Civil-Liability-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-
(CLC).aspx. 
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burdens should be shared between all beneficiaries (past and future) of 
peacekeeping mandates. 
C. The Case from Economics 
As a historical matter, the grant of immunity from all forms of 
process might be explained by the political power of contributing states: 
member states created broad rules to safeguard the UN—and themselves—
from jurisdiction by national courts.129 Today, both TCCs and funding states 
continue to argue for a broad reading of the U . N . ’ s  immunities, despite 
opposition at times from other branches of government.130 Indeed, from an 
economic point of view, any immunity is questionable because it affects the 
credibility of an actor’s commitments—there is a moral hazard in immunity that 
the actor will not fulfill transactions as promised.131 What is striking about the 
economic rationale for absolute immunity is that it privileges the interests of 
states over individuals. Member states of the U .N.  are protected by absolute 
immunity at the expense of the individuals, who are the intended 
beneficiaries of the U.N.’s actions. 
There are concrete economic reasons for limited immunity. Because 
immunity takes away the incentive to behave as promised, lesser immunity could 
incentivize the U .N .  not to commit future torts by, for example, encouraging 
investment in appropriate equipment and quick reactions when problems 
occur. In the Haiti case, narrower immunities might have led to better screening 
guidelines, the proper installation of lavatories, and a faster reaction after cholera 
was discovered. In the Kosovo Lead Poisoning case, narrower immunities might 
have led to an immediate decision to move the Roma populations to a safer site, 
as prevention is cheaper than ex-ante compensation.132 
The point can also be made by considering how the U.N. reacts in the 
commercial sphere. In its commercial activities, the U . N .  protects its 
reputation by providing alternatives to immunities in the form of alternate 
dispute resolution mechanisms, such as arbitration procedures. The U . N .  
                                                 
129  Rashkow, supra note 9, at 333–34. 
130  See, for example, Press Release, Rep. Maxine Waters, Congresswoman Waters Urges United Nations 
to Commit Resources to Eradicate Cholera in Haiti (May 31, 2013) (urging U.N. to address Haiti 
Cholera Claim), available at https://waters.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congresswoman 
-waters-urges-united-nations-commit-resources-eradicate. 
131  Anne Van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and Economics, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 421, 460 (2014) 
(providing a behavioral international law analysis of credible commitments.    Van Aaken’s article 
on the distributional consequences of international responsibility, discussed infra at note 191, 
provides the link to the moral hazards of immunities, whereby their effect on the UN’s 
responsibility is discussed.). 
132  Culhane, supra note 124, at 1104 (“recognizing that some harms are inevitable, the best approach is 
to prevent and to compensate when prevention fails.”). 
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behaves as a private actor because its reputation will determine its 
possibilities in the market place. Because private individuals are not able to 
protect themselves in the same way, however, individuals injured during 
peacekeeping operations cannot leverage their role against the Organization. 
From an economic perspective, immunities should be judged according 
to their purpose and function, not on the legal form of the actor. The UN 
and courts have implicitly transformed t h e  U N ’ s  immunities rationae 
materiae into immunity rationae personae. In other words, judges and policy 
makers justify upholding the UN’s immunity because it is the UN, rather than 
on the basis of the UN’s functional needs. This reinforces the case for partial 
immunity and explains the trend in other fields of immunity to accept a rule of 
immunity subject to exceptions.133 
D.  Counterarguments 
Two objections are likely to arise in response to the arguments in favor 
of limited U.N. immunity. First, there is an argument that paying out on mass 
torts claims might bankrupt the Organization. In an era where the U.N. is 
increasingly called on to undertake expanded mandates, sometimes without 
adequate resources, the likelihood of responsibility arising from omissions is 
greater. One response might be that this is the cost of doing business. Even if 
these cases put the U . N .  out of business, the independence of the 
Organization should not be sacrificed to individual rights.134 This is neither a 
desired nor a likely outcome.  
The approach advocated here is for the U.N. to get liability insurance for 
claims above the caps established under its general liability scheme. In other 
words, the U .N .  has chosen a self-insurance mechanism for claims up to 
$50,000, whereby the U . N .  pays compensation out of its regular budget. 
U.N. member states should consider a new policy to purchase insurance for 
claims above $50,000, including mass torts claims. If this is too expensive, the 
UN should maintain a dedicated contingency fund that it can draw from to settle 
or compensate torts victims. 
Will third-party claims put the U.N. out of business? A closer examination 
of the figures is helpful. In the Haiti Cholera case, the complaint filed in the 
SDNY by the IJDH does not specifically request compensatory damages on 
behalf of the plaintiffs.135 IJDH did, however, submit claims through the U .N. ’ s  
                                                 
133  FOX & WEBB, supra note 48, at 411. See also Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, How Does 
Customary International Law Change? The Case of State Immunity, 59 INT’L STUD. Q. 209 (2015). 
134  See generally Verdier & Voeten, supra note 133. 
135  The Complaint’s prayer for relief includes only a general request for “declaratory relief, 
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internal claims office on behalf of 5,000 Haitians, requesting a minimum of 
$100,000 for the families or next of kin of each person killed by cholera and at 
least $50,000 for each victim who suffered illness or injury from cholera.136 Based 
on these figures, the IDJH was demanding $830 million at a minimum, for the 
next of kin and survivors of each person killed by cholera. For the 670,700 
remaining surviving victims, the IJDH sought at least $33 billion.137 The total 
of these demands equals $36.5 billion (which includes a $2.2 claim against the 
Haitian government for remediation of Haiti’s waterways). In the Mothers of 
Srebrenica case, lawyers representing the 6,000 plaintiffs asked for €25,000 per 
plaintiff from the Netherlands (not the UN), which represents a lower figure 
than the Haiti Cholera case. Nonetheless, it is not directly comparable to the Haiti 
Cholera case in that the claim for damages in Mothers of Srebrenica was made against 
the Dutch State rather than the UN.138 
While these are significant figures, there is every reason to believe a more 
realistic number is closer to half that, at $15 - $18 billion.  Plaintiffs’ figures should 
be viewed as a negotiating position, rather than as an accurate estimate of the 
potential claim against the U.N. for a number of reasons. First, in the process of 
assessing the claim, both the class size and the monetary requests would be 
scrutinized and reduced. If the U . N . ’ s  own liability scheme was applied, 
the compensatory ceilings would be capped at $50,000 per deceased or 
injured.139 The damages requested would a l m o s t  c e r t a i n l y  be reduced by 
approximately half at the outset to $18.25 billion. Second, one would expect 
that the class size, which is optimistically proposed but not independently 
verified, would be reduced as well. 
                                                 
[]actual, injunctive, compensatory and punitive damages to remedy the injuries sustained by the 
Plaintiffs and the Class.” Class Action Complaint, Georges v. United Nations, Docket # 1:13-
cv-07146-JPO 65, ¶ 2 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Haiti Class Action Complaint], 
available at http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Cholera-Complaint.pdf. 
136  According to the Complaint, the “Class includes at least 679,000 individual [victims], 
including the representatives of the more than 8,300 people who contracted and died from 
the cholera epidemic.” Id. at 1, ¶ 2. 
137  The Complaint also sought $2.2 billion “for remediation of Haiti’s waterways, and provision of 
adequate sanitation to Plaintiffs and Class members in amounts to be determined at trial.” Id. at 
65, ¶ 2. 
138  This figure can be seen in the case’s Writ of Summons. Writ of Summons ¶ 439, Mothers 
of Srebrenica v. State of the Netherlands and United Nations, Case No. 295247 / HA ZA 07-
2973 (The Hague D. Ct. 2007), available at http://www.vandiepen.com/fileadmin/ 
user_upload/Documenten/PDF/Screbrenica/Srebrenica_stukken_Engels/1_Writ_of_summons.
pdf. In a 2014 decision, the Dutch State was found liable for the deaths of 320 men at 
Srebrenica. Judgment ¶ 4.338, Mothers of Srebrenica v. State of the Netherlands, Case No. 
295247/ HA ZA 07-2973 (The Hague D. Ct. 2014), available at http://www.vandiepen.com/ 
fileadmin/user_upload/Documenten/Judgment_District_Court_The_ Hague_16-07-14.pdf. 
139  See discussion of General Assembly Resolution 52/247, supra note 68. 
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The UN’s proposed 2014–15 budget was $19.8 billion, and the revised 
net budget for the biennium 2012–13 was $19.7 billion.140 Therefore, the total 
proposed net budget for the United Nations in 2014–2015 would equal about 
54% of the total monetary demands made by the IJDH on behalf of the Haiti 
class action plaintiffs, according to the figures above.  With the reductions 
suggested thereafter, it would constitute the equivalent of a year of the UN’s 
budget.  
A successful claim in this amount would place an extraordinary burden on 
the Organization. Nonetheless, as Byron Stier argues in the context of domestic 
torts cases, the endgame in large torts cases involves three possible outcomes: 
“ (1) plaintiffs litigate the defendant into bankruptcy; (2) defendants rebuff 
plaintiffs' claims by litigating and generally winning; or (3) defendants and 
plaintiffs agree upon a non-class settlement.”141 In the Haiti case, the UN won 
under (2) by rejecting the claim internally on the basis of the public law category 
and successfully asserting its immunities in subsequent federal court proceedings. 
The plaintiffs’ strategy unquestionably involved category (3) - an invitation to 
settle and an apology, perhaps even on an ex gratia (no liability).  
Despite the extreme unlikelihood of bankruptcy under (1), these concerns 
could be abated if e i ther  the UN gets commerc ia l  insurance against torts 
claims or is required by member states to maintain a larger contingency fund.142 
At present, the UN insures against automobile and plane accidents, granting 
those harmed by UN action a direct right of redress.143 It also held third-party 
liability insurance for its headquarters in New York until the 1980s, when it 
decided to move to a partial insurance scheme, largely due to increasing insurance 
premiums.144 Interestingly, the UN must waive its immunity to enter into 
                                                 
140  These figures reflect the “total net budget,” which include itemized expenditures and income in 
the “regular budget,” as well as itemized expenditures categorized as “extrabudgetary.” U.N. 
Secretary-General, Proposed Program Budget for the Biennium 2014–2015, U.N. Doc. A/68/6, at 20 
(May 10, 2013), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/6% 
20 (Introduction). 
141  Byron G. Stier, Crimtorts, Class Actions, and the Emerging Mass Tort Method, 17 WIDENER L.J. 893, 
920–21 (2008). 
142  It is outside the scope of this Article to estimate the costs or investigate the procedural 
ramifications of a UN liability policy. 
143  Rashkow, supra note 9, at 338. 
144  Szasz, supra note 29, at 740-42 (noting that “[s]ince their member states expect the organizations 
they establish to be good international citizens, they have prohibited them from hiding behind their 
functional immunity for the purpose of evading either contract- or tort-related responsibilities. 
Indeed, they may only use their immunity in order to avoid litigation in a national court or some 
other inappropriate forum; but if they cannot resolve a dispute, for example with a tort claimant, 
they must offer some other suitable means of settling the matter, such as by arbitration… as a result, 
among the many [commercial insurance] policies that the United Nations has thus contracted for, 
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insurance contracts, because it would not be feasible to take out insurance 
without permitting the insurance companies to defend a g a i n s t  suits that 
might be brought against the UN.145  
Given the rise of mass torts cases against the UN, however, the U.N. 
should reconsider the possibility that it can, as Paul Szasz wrote, return to 
“ what most prudent businesses do: [ ] contract[s] for insurance, in the regular 
commercial market.”146 Insurance is therefore one way to provide for the 
victims of eventual torts claims and is standard in other industries. For a fee, 
similar to charities, the U.N. can “shift the risk of tort damages to insurers, 
who could calculate risks and pool funds to cover the costs.”147 Moreover, third-
party liability insurance coverage would remedy injustices that the U.N.’s 
jurisdictional immunity before national courts imposes on parties who are 
harmed by its actions.148 
Because the UN moved away from commercial insurance towards a self-
insurance scheme in the 1980s, partly as a result of increasing costs in insurance 
premiums, private insurance may not be attractive to Member States. Although it 
is impossible to calculate insurance premiums for the UN in the abstract without 
a claims history or risk assessment, if private insurance is too expensive for the 
UN to bear, an alternative strategy would be for the UN to continue to self-insure, 
but maintain a larger contingency fund for torts cases. This is the route chosen by 
many major pharmaceutical and oil and gas corporations that have significant tort 
exposure:  the public filings of Exxon, Shell, and McNeil (maker of Tylenol) all 
disclose that these corporations self-insure.  The UN’s current strategy may, 
therefore, be a sound one but it must be accompanied by a large enough 
contingency fund that the UN can compensate valid private law claims. 
The second counterargument against moving away from absolute 
immunity is consequentialist—a retreat from absolute immunity will deter TCCs 
because the standard memorandum of understanding between the U.N. and 
TCCs indemnifies the TCCs. The U.N. routinely deals with claims that arise 
from the activities of its special operational programs, often entering into 
                                                 
some on a worldwide basis and others locally, are those covering the Organization's third-party 
liability at its headquarters in New York…” Szasz then goes on to discuss the reasons for the turn 
to self-insurance.). 
145  PIETER H.F. BEKKER, THE LEGAL POSITION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: A 
FUNCTIONAL NECESSITY ANALYSIS OF THEIR LEGAL STATUS AND IMMUNITIES 204 (1994). 
146  Szasz, supra note 29, at 740. 
147  Quality of Mercy, supra note 11, at 1395. 
148  I.L.A. Final Report, supra note 112, at 39 (citing M. Singer, Jurisdictional Immunity of 
International Organizations: Human Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 53, 80 
(1995)). 
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hold-harmless agreements with host states.149 It is not clear, however, that 
there is any truth to the rumors that TCCs will be deterred from future 
peacekeeping missions because of torts cases. In fact, what appears to be of far 
more concern to TCCs is the expansion of “robust” peacekeeping missions in 
which peacekeepers have an offensive mandate.150 These riskier missions 
inherently possess a higher likelihood of peacekeeper casualties, which 
might affect support for peacekeeping operations of TCCs at home and 
raise the potential for criminal suits based on violations of international 
humanitarian law. Here, however, the scope of U .N .  immunity would not be 
an issue because criminal acts by individuals are within the jurisdiction of courts 
of the sending state. Routine torts cases are viewed by TCCs as issues to be 
addressed responsibly by the Organization, not matters that will affect support 
for peacekeeping operations at home. 
IV.  CONSIDERATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PARTIAL  
U.N. IMMUNITY 
This Article has argued that the U.N.’s immunities should not be 
understood as absolute despite being extremely broad. It has also argued that 
there are external and internal aspects to the U.N.’s immunities. The U.N.’s 
external immunities operate with respect to the jurisdiction of national courts 
over the U.N. and are very broad. In contrast, the U.N.’s internal immunities 
are narrower and are informed by the distinction between public and private 
disputes. 
Despite deeply problematic responses to the Haiti and Kosovo claims to 
date, the U.N.’s existing system is well designed to the extent that, wherever the 
claims go as t o  issues of operational necessity, policy, or constitutional matters 
of the Organization, it is appropriate for the U . N .  to assert immunity 
internally and externally. Moreover, it is also sufficient in that private law claims 
should be settled by appropriate modes of settlement under Article 29 (or 
“reasonable alternative means” in the language of the court). What requires 
further elaboration is how to determine what is “functionally necessary” to the 
U.N.’s external immunities, and what remedies are available if the U.N. does not 
provide appropriate modes of settlement internally. 
                                                 
149  See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, The Practice of the United Nations, the specialized agencies and 
the Atomic Energy Agency concerning their status, privileges and immunities, Mar. 8–May 23, 1 9 6 7 ,  
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.118; U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.118/Add.1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.118/Add.2 
(1967); Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, The Practice of the United Nation, the Specialized 
Agencies and the Atomic Energy Agency Concerning Their Status, Privileges and Immunities, May 27–July 
28, 1985, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.383, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.383/Add.1-3 (1985). 
150  Although the concept emerged generally in the 1990s with regards to peacekeeping, peace 
operations have become increasingly robust. The Intervention Brigade in the DRC is a current 
example of such an offensive mission. 
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In the next section, I will discuss what consequences should follow from 
the failure to provide a reasonable means to settlement to a private law claim; 
distinguish between operational necessity and constitutional matters of the 
organization, and suggest in borderline cases the UN should waive its 
immunity.   I will also introduce the historic Congo case from 1964 as an example 
of a responsible settlement with third-party claimants. Even if in practice these 
considerations are difficult to implement, as a matter of public legitimacy, the 
U . N .  must not be seen to be above the law. The status quo suggests that 
the U . N .  has immunity from accountability. This reality is in tension with 
an important principle in the law of immunities: that immunity from jurisdiction 
is not a privilege and that it does not free an organization from applicable law.151 
A.  The U.N. Must Provide Reasonable Alternative Means 
Under Article 29 of the CPIUN, the U.N. must provide alternative modes 
of settlement for private law claims, but no criteria were supplied in the CPIUN 
to indicate what those alternatives might look like.  It is clear that a robust internal 
review system would be far superior to the alternatives.152 From an efficiency 
perspective, an internal process that is fairly run will be the least costly solution 
to most claims. In particular, it can avoid or minimize the legal costs and delays 
associated with private law suits. Moreover, it will avoid the very dangerous 
situation of national courts taking jurisdiction over U .N.  matters and assessing 
claims irresponsibly or in a political matter.153 
In the last decade, the U.N. has demonstrated creativity with regards to the 
mechanisms it makes available to private individuals, including the establishment 
of a staff labor tribunal, the Ombudspersons office for the Al Qaida sanctions 
                                                 
151  SCHERMERS, supra note 35, at 1037. 
152  See Statement made by Denmark on Behalf of the Nordic Countries, Sixth Committee, 
3 ,  69th Sess., 18th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.18 (Oct. 23, 2014), available at 
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/4654068/denmark-en-85.pdf. [hereinafter 2014 
Danish Statement to Sixth Committee] (“In recent years the issue of settlement of disputes 
of a private character to which an international organisation is a party has gained 
increasing importance. Particularly with regard to dispute settlement procedures in UN 
peace operations the present system does not seem entirely adequate. While we do not 
support changing the general rules of immunity before domestic courts, we do believe that 
further work could be done to ensure that private individuals who suffer harm as a consequence 
of peace keeping operations are compensated. There are obviously important issues related to the 
inherent risks in situations of conflict and instability, and it is of paramount importance to the 
Nordic countries that the effective and independent functioning of UN peace operations is not 
jeopardized. But we do, nevertheless, also believe that there is room for further reflection on 
whether the present system and procedures are adequate to handle legitimate claims from 
private individuals.”). 
153  See supra text accompanying notes 44–47. 
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list, and the Ombudsperson for claims arising in Kosovo.154 It is the re fore  
time for U .N.  member states to develop a new model appropriate for large 
torts cases.155 There are a variety of other models that could serve as inspiration, 
including the 9/11 Victims Compensation Fund in the U.S. or the U.N.’s own 
Iran Claims Tribunal.156 Alternatively, the U.N. might simply expand the mandate 
of local claims boards, which already have jurisdiction over individual torts 
committed in peacekeeping operations.157 Whatever the forum, internal U.N.  
mechanisms must be (and appear to be) impartial, transparent, and required to 
provide reasons for their decisions. Moreover, there should be a limited right of 
review of the decisions of local boards to an appellate body.158 
From a historical perspective, the U .N. ’ s  response to torts that occurred 
in the Congo is instructive. In 1960, the U.N. established the U.N. Organization 
in the Congo (ONUC) to address the unrest that took place after the Republic 
of Congo gained independence from Belgian rule.159 The Congolese 
government requested U . N .  military intervention against the Belgian troops 
that remained in the country. At the time, it was “the biggest single effort under 
United Nations colours, organized and directed by the United Nations itself.”160 
Peacekeeping forces were deployed to help restore law and order to the country, 
but these efforts failed and, in 1961, the central government of Congo collapsed. 
ONUC was authorized to take all measures, including the use of force, to prevent 
civil war.161 Despite these efforts, conditions in the country continued to worsen 
and citizens from many TCCs were injured or killed. 
                                                 
154  For a description of the office of the U.N. Ombudsperson for the Al Qaida regime, visit 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/. 
155  As noted above, although a standing claims commission was envisioned in the Model SOFA, it has 
never been set up in the Organization’s history. 
156  See Culhane, supra note 124 ( discussing the VCF in detail with regard to corrective and 
distributive justice goals). 
157  The Netherlands suggested this approach in a Statement to the Sixth Committee in 2014. Statement 
made to the Netherlands, Sixth Committee, 5 – 6 ,  69th Sess., 23rd Meeting, 5 – 6  (Oct. 31, 
2014) http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/4654811/netherlands.pdf. 
158  This could be an internal body, and existing court on an ad hoc basis like the PCA, or in exceptional 
circumstances, the matter could be appealed to a national court, which could require the UN to 
reassess the matter in question and report back within a year. 
159  S.C. Res. 143, U.N. Doc. S/RES/143 (July 14, 1960). 
160  Statement of the Secretary General to the Security Council, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. S/PV.877 (July 
20, 1960). 
161  U.N. Doc. S/4741 (Feb. 21, 1961); U.N. Doc. S/5002 (Nov. 24, 1961). Despite this, the ICJ 
determined that the ONUC operation was not an enforcement action under Chapter VII powers. 
Advisory Opinion, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the 
Charter), 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20, 1962). 
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In 1966, a Belgian national brought a suit against the U.N. in Belgian 
court for property damaged and looted during the operation.162 In response, 
and “without prejudice to the privileges and immunities which the United 
Nations enjoys,” the Secretary General made a lump-sum payment to the Belgian 
government for the settlement of all disputes of its nationals relating to ONUC 
operations.163 The U.N. also negotiated lump-sum settlements with nine other 
countries to make reparations for breaches of its “obligations under international 
law.”164 The claims were not handled by local review boards, but through global 
settlement agreements to avoid the public scrutiny that would come from having 
the disputes brought before a claims commission.165 
B.  The Immunity Must Involve a Core Mission or a 
Constitutional Question 
Immunities serve valid purposes in protecting the Organization. Both 
the internal and external immunities of the U.N. rely, to a certain degree, on 
concepts of functionalism. Nonetheless, functionalism is particularly pertinent to 
the U.N. ’ s  external immunities because Article 5 of the U.N. Charter 
provides the U.N. with immunities that are functionally necessary. While it is 
true, as Jan Klabbers has asserted, that member states might justify anything as 
functionally necessary in order to protect the Organization, one of the key areas 
where further delineation is needed is with regards to operational necessity. 
When cases arise that challenge U . N .  actions in the course of a 
peacekeeping operation there will be a tendency to uphold the U.N.’s immunity 
on the basis of functionalism and operational necessity. The decision in the 
Mothers of Srebrenica case, however, serves as a cautionary tale about overbroad 
readings of the U . N . ’ s  purpose. Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
in the early 1990s, Serb separatists waged war against Bosniaks in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In 1993, the U.N. established six designated “safe zones” 
p r o t e c t e d  b y  U . N .  p e a c e k e e p e r s  throughout the country, including 
one in Srebrenica. The U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Srebrenica 
was comprised of a battalion of Dutch soldiers. In July 1995, Serb forces 
launched an attack against the safe zone. The lightly-armed peacekeepers stood 
                                                 
162  Manderlier v. Organisation des Nations Unies et l'Etat Belge (Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres), JT 721 (Brussels Civil Court 1966); 45 I.L.R. 446 (1972). 
163  Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement between the United Nations and Belgium Relating to the 
Settlement of Claims Filed Against the United Nations in the Congo by Belgian Nationals: New York, 
20 February 1965, 1965 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 19, 39 (1965). 
164  Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 59th Sess., Commentary on ¶ 2, U .N .  Doc. A/62/10, Art. 39 
(May 7–July 5, 2007). 
165  Freedman, supra n o t e  9 9 ,  at 248. 
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down and evacuated their own forces, leaving behind the Bosniak civilians 
who had come there for protection. Afterward, over a period of several days, 
Serb forces killed over 8,000 people, mostly men and boys, as the civilians tried 
to leave Srebrenica on their own. 
Relatives of the victims who attempted to bring a claim for compensation 
directly to the Secretary General, however, received no response.166 They 
proceeded to litigate the matter in Dutch courts.167 The U . N .  invoked its 
immunity, and the District Court concluded that “in international-law practice 
the absolute immunity of the U.N. is the norm and is respected… it is in principle 
not at the discretion of a national court” to decide whether the invocation of 
immunity was necessary to fulfill the U . N . ’ s  purposes as that would be 
“contrary to the ratio of the immunity of the UN.”168 In March 2010, the 
Court of Appeal upheld the U.N.’s immunity, and the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands followed suit the year after.169 In the ultimate appeal to the 
European Court of Human Rights, the U . N . ’ s  absolute immunity was 
upheld. The court reasoned that bringing military operations under Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the U . N .  within the scope of national jurisdiction would 
allow States to interfere with the key mission of the U.N. to secure international 
peace and security. 170 
                                                 
166  The U.N. did send a letter to the representative of the Netherlands asking for appropriate action 
to be taken to ensure the U.N.’ s  privileges and immunities. Letter from Larry D. Johnson, 
Asst. Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, to Mr. Frank Majoor, Permanent Representative 
of the Netherlands to the United Nations (Aug. 17, 2007) (“We wish to advise that it is the 
consistent and well-established practice of the United Nations to request Governments to 
intervene in court proceedings with a view to informing national courts of the position taken 
by the Organization and asserting the Organization's privileges and immunities under applicable 
legal instruments.”). 
167  Writ of Summons, supra note 138, ¶ 286 (“Prior to the commencement of these proceedings 
the legal representatives of Plaintiff and the persons whose interests are promoted by 
Foundation, have brought the present matter to the attention of the U . N .  and the State 
of the Netherlands. Neither the State of The Netherlands nor the U.N. showed any willingness 
to enter into negotiations regarding the matter, and for that reason it is necessary to institute legal 
proceedings.”). 
168  Judgment in Incidental Proceedings ¶¶ 5.12–5.14, 5.24, District Court of The Hague, July 10, 2008, 
De Rechtspraak BD6795 (Neth.) (English translation available in De Rechtspraak at LJN:
 BD6796). 
169  Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands (Admissibility), supra note 4. 
170  Id. at ¶¶ 154–65 (finding that bringing military operations under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the U.N. within the scope of national jurisdiction would mean allowing States to interfere with 
the key mission of the U . N .  to secure international peace and security; that a civil claim 
did not override immunity for the sole reason that it was based on an allegation of a particularly 
grave violation of international law, even genocide; and, that in the circumstances the 
absence of alternative access to a jurisdiction did not oblige the national courts to intervene). 
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While this case involved sensitive issues of discretion, the broad reading 
of operational necessity resulted in a finding that immunity trumped basic 
principles of law. As a matter of criminal law, when a guardian or fiduciary 
deserts or abandons a ward or fails to provide necessary care, criminal charges 
follow.171 Similarly, in tort law, although there is no duty to rescue passersby, 
once a Good Samaritan begins a rescue, they are held to a certain duty of care 
and will usually be found liable for harms that occur in the course of a 
rescue.172 Reasoning by analogy, the U.N. started a rescue by setting up a 
peacekeeping mission and establishing safe areas, but failed to protect the 
individuals who relied on these acts. The Mothers of Srebrenica decision suggests 
that the parameters of operational necessity require careful scrutiny.173 
Tests developed by a number of European courts to assess the functional 
necessity of organizational immunities may provide a way forward. Several 
European courts have focused on whether the action taken by an IO was an 
essential or supplementary action, such that only the activities necessary for the 
Organization to carry out their essential functions may be protected under 
privileges and immunities.174 Furthermore, a number of European courts have 
developed a distinction between “conduct that is closely related to the core of 
an IO’s functions or entails an exercise of public authority; and, conversely, 
conduct that touches upon the functions of the IO in a more peripheral manner 
or cannot be distinguished from conduct of a private entity.”175 
C. In Borderline Cases, the U.N. Must Assess Whether It 
Should Waive Its Immunity 
The third consideration in determining whether to assert internal or external 
immunities rests with the UN.  The U.N. can always choose to waive its immunity 
                                                 
171  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (Hornbook Series 3d ed. 2000). 
172  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 323 (1965). 
173  Interestingly however, the clause excepting operational necessity was omitted from the 
UNPROFOR SOFA, so this outcome was not mandated. Agreement on the Status of the United 
Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ¶ 48, May 15, 1993, 1722 U.N.T.S. 77 
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and Herzegovina do not have jurisdiction because of any provision of the present Agreement, shall 
be settled by a standing claims commission to be established for that purpose.”). 
174  See, for example, Banque africaine de developpement, Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for 
judicial matters], Jan. 25, 2005, Bull. civ. V, No. 04-41.012 (Fr.). 
175  See Brief of European Law Scholars and Practitioners as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants and Supporting Reversal, Georges v. United Nations, No. 15-455, at 15 (2d Cir. 2015), 
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and voluntarily submit itself to suit.176 This authority rests with the Secretary 
General.177 Some scholars have suggested that the failure to exercise this option 
can result in abuse of immunity.178 U.N. practice on waivers is narrow, it operates 
on a case-by-case basis and not in advance of dispute. Moreover, it has been 
limited to criminal or civil cases against staff. Even in cases of insurable 
claims, waiver is seldom exercised.179 Nonetheless, the U.N. can adopt new 
approaches to its waiver practice and has been urged to do so in other contexts. 
The Zeid Report on Peacekeeping, for example, recommended the U.N. waive 
its immunity in cases where criminal acts were committed with some connection 
to an official position, and “where continued immunity would impede the course 
of justice and where immunity can be waived without prejudice to the interests of 
the United Nations.”180 
V.  CONCLUSION: THE PUBLIC LEGITIMACY OF THE U.N. AND 
ROLE OF MEMBER STATES 
Since its founding, the U . N .  has been an organization in the 
process of constant development.181 New roles have been attributed to the 
Organization, and many of the U.N.’s core responsibilities today, such as 
peacekeeping, were not envisioned when the Charter was drafted. Moreover, its 
mandate has evolved toward individuals. From human rights,182 to the creation 
                                                 
176  Chanaka Wickremasinghe, International Organizations or Institutions, Immunities before National 
Courts, in M A X  P L A N C K  E N C Y C L O P E D I A  O F  P U B L I C  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  
L A W  ¶ 9 (July 2009) (“The one exception to immunity that is applicable to all international 
organizations is in cases of waiver, ie a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the forum 
by the international organization in question.”). 
177  Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations §§ 20,  23 , Feb. 13, 1946, 
1 U.N.T.S. 15. 
178  JENKS, supra note 57, at 94–95 (arguing that immunity should be waived where it would impede the 
course of justice). 
179  GUGLIELMO VERIDRAMER, THE U.N. AND HUMAN RIGHTS: WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? 357–
58 (2011). 
180  Zeid Report, supra note 22, ¶ 86. 
181  VON SCHORLEMER, supra note 3 3 , at 467 (“The existence of many of the ‘core’ activities of the 
U.N. nowadays may be explained by functional necessity, i.e. they reflect the practical need to adjust 
the organization’s structure to challenges which had not been foreseen by the drafters of the U.N. 
Charter at the time of its adoption.”). 
182  The preoccupation of the UN with individuals can be demonstrated by the Commission on Human 
Rights, which drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR, now 
viewed as constituting customary international law was given “teeth” by the ICCPR and is overseen 
by a monitoring body within the UN that can hear complaints from individuals.  “The Economic 
and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion 
of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its 
functions.” UN Charter art. 68. 
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of international criminal tribunals, to its sanctions practice, the U.N. regularly 
engages deeply with individuals.183 
Courts have assumed that the Organization’s principal function 
is to maintain international peace and security, and that its relations are 
primarily with member states. Yet international organizations have 
constituencies outside of member states.184 UN Charter Provisions 1(3), 55 and 
56 require the UN to respect human rights, even if there is debate over 
whether the Organization is directly bound by human rights.185 The UN Charter 
refers to “the peoples.”186 Moreover, recent UN policies assume obligations 
toward private individuals. The Human Rights Due Diligence policy, for 
example, prohibits the UN from providing direct or indirect support (ranging 
from financial and tactical, to control over operations in the field) where there 
is a substantial risk of human rights, international humanitarian law or refugee 
law violations.187 The policy also requires the UN to conduct a risk assessment 
involving the recipient’s compliance record with international law, review its 
record in taking effective steps to hold perpetrators of violations accountable, 
and assess whether the UN can influence behavior over compliance with rights 
held by individuals.188 UN practice is superceding precedents that suggest that the 
UN’s obligation is to member states. 
From the perspective of individuals as third party claimants, these 
developments are relevant to theories of responsibility. A threshold question 
with regards to who compensates third parties harmed during peacekeeping 
operations is what entities can be held responsible for third-party compensation. 
This Article has assumed that the Organization itself would be the responsible 
party, but it is important to acknowledge that other avenues may be available. 
One approach would be to pierce the corporate veil and hold member states 
                                                 
183  The only regime in the last decade that has applied “comprehensive” sanctions is Libya, in 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973, and that decision was driven by the nature of the Libyan state and its 
control over most assets. Larissa Van den Herik, Peripheral Hegemony in the Quest to Ensure Security 
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427 (2014). 
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185  2014  Rights Up Front Action Plan, available at http://www.un.org/sg/rightsupfront/ 
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187  For an assessment, see Helmut Philipp Aust, The UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy: An Effective 
Mechanism against Complicity of Peacekeeping Forces?, 19 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 1, 3 (2014). 
188  Id. at 5–6. 
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responsible for the acts of the Organization, as in the International Tin 
Council189 and Westland Helicopter190 cases. As Christiane Ahlborn writes, however, 
while this method would provide injured parties with a remedy, it might be 
a disincentive for states to invest into international cooperation in the 
future.191 This may explain why there are so few examples in practice. 
Theories of multiple attribution of conduct suggest that responsibility 
might also be shared in cases of military operations under the U.N. The cases 
of Behrami and Saramati v. France and Norway,192 Al Jedda v. UK,193 and Nuhanovic v. 
The Netherlands194 all concern the question of whether wrongful conduct of 
peacekeepers was attributable to the U.N. or to the sending states. While the 
judgments ultimately opted for attribution of conduct to either the U . N .  or 
member states, the courts either explicitly or implicitly acknowledged the 
possibility that the conduct might be attributed to dual entities. The 
International Law Commission has a l so  acknowledged that, although it may 
not appear frequently in practice, multiple attribution of conduct is possible.195 
For victims of wrongdoing, these developments are important. As Andre 
Nollkaemper and Dov Jacobs have suggested, it is no longer acceptable for 
states or other actors to not be held accountable for their actions. 196 Shared 
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responsibility is a mechanism to hold states or other entities liable to pay 
reparations for damage caused. 197  
When courts have found that acts should be attributed to the UN, as the 
European Court of Human Rights did in the Behrami and Saramati case, injured 
parties were left without a remedy because the ECHR determined it did not 
have jurisdiction over the UN.198 However, in Nuhanovic, the Dutch Court of 
Appeal in The Hague observed that effective control by the Netherlands did 
not exclude the possibility of effective control by others including the UN.199 
The suggestion that power may be held by more than one actor at the same time 
expands the opportunities for redress by claimants and hence, for compensation 
in cases of mass torts.200 
This Article has made two proposals. First, it is time to revert to the 
functional immunities originally envisioned for the U.N. under Article 105 of 
the U.N. Charter. Second, the U.N. should purchase third- party insurance 
for mass torts or maintain a contingency fund so that it has resources available 
to fairly settle private claims that arise.  
A third consideration is put forward in the Conclusion: U . N .  member 
states should engage in the conversation about what types of alternative modes 
of dispute settlement the U . N .  needs today. Member states collectively have 
a responsibility to steer the organization, and in certain circumstances, to make 
reparations on behalf of the Organization.201 
In 1960, Inis Claude predicted that the function of legitimization was and 
would continue to be a highly significant part of the political role of the U . N. 
Distinguishing it from a process of legal order, he wrote, “Collective 
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legitimization has developed, for better or for worse, as essentially a political 
function, sought for political reasons, exercised by political organs through 
the operation of a political process, and productive of political results.”202 The 
U . N .  is the best facsimile of an authentic voice of mankind (albeit not an 
authentic one), one that statesmen treat as the most impressive and 
authoritative instrument for the expression of the global, general will.203 As he 
writes, “for better or for worse, the development of the United Nations as 
custodian of collective legitimization is an important political phenomenon of our 
time.”204 
Because of the centrality of public legitimacy to the UN, it is imperative 
that member states buy in to its mandate. If not, the U.N.’s significance will 
wane. The U.N.’s handling of large torts cases has affected the U . N . ’ s  
standing with member states.205 It has also triggered critical commentary in the 
press—the New York Times reported that “the United Nations has failed to 
face up to its role in [Haiti’s] continuing tragedy.”206 The Washington Post 
further argued that “by refusing to acknowledge responsibility, the United 
Nations jeopardizes its standing and moral authority.”207 The U.N.’s public 
legitimacy is damaged when programmatic principles, such as the Rule of Law, 
are not applied consistently. 
The categorical determination that the U.N. is absolutely immune is 
normatively problematic and, from a political legitimacy perspective, untenable 
in light of the U . N . ’ s  contemporary mandate and impact on individuals. 
It behooves member states to develop new mechanisms for addressing claims 
against it by individuals and to acknowledge that national courts may begin to 
step in to correct the balance if the U.N. fails to take the lead.208 
There is some urgency to these reforms. Domestic courts are making 
decisions in parallel that are relevant to potential IO responsibility. The Dutch 
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Supreme Court’s Nuhanovic decision held that just because responsibility is 
attached to a state does not necessarily mean that it cannot be attached to an IO 
as well.209 This is in contrast to prior case law that suggested that if the U.N. was 
found responsible, a state could not be.210 For the European Court of Human 
Rights in the Waite and Kennedy decision, the key factor of its determination was 
whether the applicants had reasonable alternative means to protect their rights. 
An IO, the court said, must provide those means.211 If an organization fails to 
do this, and if the facts of the case warrant it, courts may start paring down IO 
immunities.212 While the Dutch district court ultimately concluded that it was 
not for national courts to determine what is necessary to the U . N . ’ s  
functioning,213 similar outcomes are not guaranteed in the future. Indeed, a 
dangerous situation will arise if courts read down the Organization’s legal 
protections. Moreover, the recent development of so-called “robust” 
peacekeeping missions that give peacekeepers an offensive mandate, rather than 
a defensive one, increases the likelihood of claims against TCCs or the U.N. for 
deaths and injuries.214 The U.N.’s expanding mandate suggests that enhanced 
risks should go hand in hand with a new process for assessing future claims. 
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